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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EMILIO ORTIZ, 
Appellant, 
vs 
KENNECOTT COPEER CORP-
(SELF-INSURED) and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Respondent. 
Industrial Commission No: 
84000914 
Utah Court of Appeals No.: 
87G527-CA 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Judge Timothy C. Allen 
Priority No.: 6 
JURISDICTION 
This is an action for review and determination of the 
lawfulness of a denial of an award by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by virtue of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 35-1-83. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a Petition for Review of the failure of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah to grant appellant's request for a 
hearing on his objections to the Medical Panel Report and to order 
him permanent total disability compensation. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented are as follows: 
1) Whether is was improper and inappropriate for the 
Industrial Commission of Utah to disallow appellant's treating 
physician to testify at the evidentiary hearing. 
2) Whether is was improper and inappropriate for the 
Industrial Commission of Utah to refuse appellant's request for a 
hearing on his objections to the Medical Panel Report. 
3) Whether appellant had established his prima facie case 
that he was permanently and totally disabled due to the industrial 
accident in concert with other physical, experience, background 
and educational factors. 
4) Whether appellant should have been referred over for a 
evaluation of vocational rehabilitation as requested. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Statutes, cases and authorities believed to be determinative 
of the respective issues include Section 35-1-77 and 35-1-67, Utah 
Code Annotated and the following case authority: Brundage v. IML 
Freight, Inc. et al, 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 1980); Marshall v. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984); 
Entwistle v. Wilkens, Utah, 626 P.2d 495 (1981); Norton v. 
Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt 
Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Peck v. 
EIMCO Process Equipment Co., 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1987) 2. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation Section, 57.51 at 10-
164.24 (1983); 
2 
The statutes and cases mentioned herein are attached 
hereto in the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* The Nature of the Case 
This case involves Mr. Emilio R. Ortiz' claim for permanent 
total disability arising out of an industrial accident which 
occurred on February 19, 1976 while he was employed as a brakeman 
and heavy laborer at Kennecott Copper Corporation. The injury 
involved his lower back which eventually led to the need for back 
surgery* 
He finally was able to return to his former employment on 
May 7, 1979. On April 9, 1980, he was awarded worker's 
compensation benefits due to the 1976 accident. 
Although he was able to work, he suffered much pain and 
continued to seek medical care and treatment from 1979 through 
1983. His condition worsened through the years. On April 3, and 
May 20, 1983, Mr. Ortiz was in relatively minor automobile 
accidents that involved injury to his lower back. These 
accidents aggravated his already severely impaired lower back he 
was unable to return to work. 
His treating physician expressed the opinion that the 
automobile accidents were "the straws that broke the camel's 
back." However, Mr. Ortiz was unable to work primarily due to the 
industrial accident. 
Mr. Ortiz applied for permanent total disability due to the 
industrial accident as well as his other physical impairments, 
lake of education, training, experience, english language ability 
and age. 
4 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On April 9, 1980, the Industrial Commission of Utah entered 
an Order awarding Mr, Ortiz workers compensation benefits. 
On October 30, 1984, he applied for permanent total 
disability compensation. 
Evidentiary hearings were held on January 21, and November 6, 
1985. 
A Medical Panel was appointed and assigned to review the 
matter on December 18, 1986. The Panel issued it's report on 
February 20, 1986. 
On March 7, 1986, Mr. Ortiz filed Objections to Medical Panel 
Report, Request for Hearing and Request for Rehabilitation 
Evaluation. 
Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen issued a Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on March 24, 1986 denying 
Mr. Ortiz1 motion. 
Mr. Ortiz filed a Motion for Review from the above order on 
April 18, 1986. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah issued its denial of Motion 
for Review on June 19, 1986. However, Mr. Ortiz and/or his 
attorney never received said denial even after several phone calls 
to the Commission to find out the status of Mr. Ortiz' Motion for 
Review until Mr. Ortiz went personally to the Industrial 
Commission on November 12, 1987. 
Mr. Ortiz filed Notice of Appeal and/or Motion and Memorandum 
5 
in Support of Motion to Reopen and/or reconsider on November 25, 
1987. 
C. Disposition by the Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission of Utah denied Mr. Ortiz' claim for 
permanent total disability, Request for Hearing on Objections to 
the Medical Panel Report and Request for Rehabilitation 
Evaluation. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Emilio R. Ortiz while in the course of his employment 
with Kennecott Copper Corporation suffered an industrial accident 
on February 19, 1976. The accident occurred when the waste car he 
was operating failed to return to its normal position after 
dumping waste so Mr. Ortiz had to use an eight foot by twelve inch 
railroad tie weighing in excess of 100 lbs. to push the car back 
into proper position. (R. 21-23, 173) 
2. The above described activity caused Mr. Ortiz to suffer 
a significant injury to his lower back which resulted in 
hospitalization on several occasions, surgery, and continued 
treatment through the present. (R. 173-174, 245) 
3. On April 9, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Joseph C. 
Foley, entered on Order awarding applicant worker's compensation 
benefits with the following finding regarding applicant permanent 
partial impairment: 
1. That the permanent partial loss of bodily function from 
all causes, including the industrial accident and pre-
existing problems, is 25%. 
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2. That the permanent partial los£ of bodily function 
attributable to cervical degeneration and trauma is 10% and 
wholly predated the industrial injury of February 19, 1976. 
3. That the lumbar loss of bodily function is 15% with 10% 
of that predating the industrial accident and the remaining 
5% directly attributable to the industrial accident and 
injury of February 19, 1976. (R. 177) 
4. Mr. Ortiz returned to work at Kennecott on May 7, 1979 
but, as the years progressed, he experienced continued problems 
and disability in his lower back for which he received medical 
care and treatment. (R. 180, 410-442, 245-250) 
5. On April 3, 1983, Mr. Ortiz was on his way to work when 
he hit some black ice before he arrived at Copperton. His car 
spun three or four times and he eventually landed in a ditch. As 
a result, he had pain in his head, neck and low back. He also had 
a worsening of leg pain after this accident. He was seen by Dr. 
Wayne Hebertson on April 6, 1983 and at that time the doctor made 
arrangements to hospitalize him, which was accomplished on April 
10, 1983. The applicant received an x-ray, CT scan, EKG, and EEG 
along with bed rest while in the hospital. He was subsequently 
discharged on April 15, 1985. The applicant started losing time 
from Kennecott on April 3, 1983 and has not worked since. (R. 250-
253) 
6. On May 20, 1983, the applicant was southbound on 200 
South in his automobile, when a car ahead stopped which forced him 
to stop also. The car behind him did not see the applicant 
stopped, and so he rear-ended him, although the applicant stated 
that the car was not going very fast. The applicant had a lot of 
pain in his back again and had worsening of leg pain. He was 
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hospitalized on May 27, 1983 at the St. Mark's Hospital by Dr. 
Hebertson, and was given physical therapy, x-rays, and bed rest. 
(R. 253-256) 
7. Subsequent to the accidents above, Mr. Ortiz made 
application for permanent total disability compensation since he 
is no longer able to work. (R. 256) 
8. At the hearing, Mr. Ortiz submitted medical evidence 
from his treating physician, Dr. Wayne Hebertson, substantiating 
his claim that he is permanently totally disabled primarily due to 
his industrial accident. (R. 272-276) 
9. It should be noted that Dr. Wayne Hebertson was present 
at the Evidentiary Hearing to discuss his opinions. 
Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen advised Mr. Ortiz that 
Dr. Hebertson would not be allowed to testify and that he would be 
allowed to testify in the event of a hearing on applicant's 
Objections to the Medical Panel Report. (R. 224-235) 
10. In addition to his lumbar spine problems, Mr. Ortiz has 
impairment due to his cervical spine. He has vision problems that 
render him blind in one eye and impaired in the other eye. He has 
only an elementary school education and is currently 59 years of 
age. He was born in Puerto Rico and his native tongue is Spanish. 
While he speaks English fairly well, he has difficulty writing or 
reading it. (R. 236-240) 
11. The matter was submitted to a Medical Panel which 
rendered a report that stated his impairment from his industrial 
accident was the same. (R. 448-452) 
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12. Mr. Ortiz filed timely objections and requested a 
hearing. Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen denied Mr. 
Ortiz's request for a hearing and denied him any benefits. (R. 
453-455, 456-60) 
13. Mr. Ortiz filed a timely Motion for Review to the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. (R. 465-471) 
14. The Utah Industrial Commission denied Mr. Ortiz' Motion 
for Review dated June 19, 1986. (R. 472-475) 
15. Mr. Ortiz and his attorneys never received the above 
described denial. Mr. Ortiz and his attorneys made several phone 
calls to Industrial Commission and were advised the Commission had 
not ruled. Mr. Ortiz finally obtained a copy by personally going 
to the Industrial Commission on November 12, 1987. (R. 510, 519) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is Mr. Ortiz* contention that ii was improper and 
inappropriate for the Industrial Commission to deny his Request 
for a Hearing on his Objections to the Medical Panel Report and a 
Request for Rehabilitation Evaluation. 
It is also Mr. Ortiz* contention that based on all factors he 
is entitled to permanent total disability compensation under Utah 
case law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Mr. Ortiz is entitled to a hearing on his Objections to 
the Medical Panel Report and for Rehabilitation 
Evaluation 
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Mr. Ortiz submitted reports from Dr. Wayne Hebertson which 
read in part: 
Mr. Ortiz* current disability dated from the 
accident of April 6, 1983. He had not been able to work 
since that time. The condition was further aggravated 
by the accident of May 20, 1983. Both accidents were 
superimposed on a prior industrial accident in 1976. X 
think his original industrial condition was gradually 
getting worse. It would probably have been necessary 
for him to retire at some point, but the accident of 
last Spring did speed up this process. Mr. Ortiz 
previously had fifteen percent permanent-partial 
impairment due to lumbar degeneration and disc 
herniation. Ten percent of the lumbar impairment was 
residual from the work injury of February 15, 1976. The 
patient currently has permanent-partial impairment 
amounting to thirty percent from all causes. I could 
only estimate that of the additional fifteen percent 
impairment, approximately seven and a half percent would 
have to be attributable to each of the accidents in 
1983. (emphasis added) 
(R. 272-276) 
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Dr. Hebertson was, and is ready, willing and able to testify 
on Mr. Ortiz's behalf in this matter to his opinion that the 
industrial accident was the primary cause for his permanent total 
disability. 
In his order, the Administrative Law Judge cites Utah Code 
Annotated 35-1-77 which read in part as follows at the time of Mr. 
Ortiz's industrial accident: 
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. . .If objections to such report aire filed it 
shal1 be the duty of the commission to set the 
case for hearing within thirtjy days to 
determine the facts and issues involved, and 
at such hearing and party so desiring may 
request the commission to have the chairman of 
the medical panel present at the hearing for 
examination and cross-examination. . . . 
(R. 456-60) 
In 1982, this section was amended to rea^ d in part as follows: 
. . . If objections to such report are filed 
the commission may set the case for hearing to 
determine the facts and issues involved, and 
at such hearing any party so desiring may 
request the Commission to have the chairman of 
the medical panel present at the hearing for 
examination and cross-examination. . . . 
The Administrative Law Judge stated in his order that he 
concludes the above amendment was a procedural rather than 
substantive change, thus, it was in his discretion whether to 
schedule a medical panel hearing. (R. 456-601) 
Mr. Ortiz disagrees with his view. By not having a medical 
panel hearing, Mr. Ortiz has been denied his opportunity to cross-
exam the doctor about his opinion. By not being allowed this 
opportunity, Mr. Ortiz cannot properly and reasonably test the 
credibility and sufficiency of the doctor's opinion. This is 
especially important in this case where Mr. Ortiz is being denied 
any additional compensation and yet, he nevertheless cannot work 
due to his medical condition. In addition, Mr. Ortiz presented 
competent, contrary medical evidence. Thus, both parties should 
be allowed to question the experts. Clearly, this is a 
substantive amendment rather than procedural when, in essence to 
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classify it otherwise denies Mr. Ortiz's application to received 
benefits. 
POINT 2 
Based on the "Odd-Lot" Doctrine, 
Mr. Ortiz should be awarded permanent total disability. 
As was stated above, Mr. Ortiz suffers from many disabling 
conditions; namely, 
a) lumbar spine impairment; 
b) cervical spine impairment; 
c) partial and total blindness of his eyes. 
In addition, Mr. Ortiz has limited education and work 
experience. He has difficulty with the English language. 
Dr. Hebertson in his reports stated Mr. Ortiz was going to 
have to retire soon because his lumbar spine disability was 
getting progressively worse due to his industrial accident. 
Because of these conditions, Mr. Ortiz is entitled to 
permanent total disability compensation. 
There are numerous cases in this jurisdiction as well as 
throughout the county that support Mr. Ortiz* contention that he 
is entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the "odd-
lot" doctrine. 
Perhaps the first case to discuss the concept of the "odd-
lot" doctrine was the English case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 
1KB 1009 (1911): 
There are cases in which the burden of shewing suitable 
work can in fact be obtained does fall upon the 
employer. . .[If]. . .the capacities for work left to 
him fit him only for special uses and do not . . . make 
his powers of labour a merchantable article in some well 
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known lines of the labour market . • . it is incumbent 
upon the employer to shew that such special employment 
can in fact be obtained by him . . . [J]f the accident 
leaves the workman's labour in the position of an "odd-
lot" in the labour market, the employer must shew that a 
customer can be found who will take it. . . 
Judge Cordozo very early in the History of workmen's 
compensation acts in the United States set the policy for odd-lot 
determination: 
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his 
request for employment with notice ths|t labor must be 
light. The applicant imposing such conditions is 
quickly put aside for more versatile competitors. 
Business has little patience with the suitor for ease 
and favor. He is the 'odd-lot' man, the nondescript in 
the labor market. Work, if he gets it, is likely to be 
casual and intermittent . . . .Rebuff, if suffered, 
might reasonably be ascribed to the narrow opportunities 
that await the sick and the halt. (Emphasis Added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the "odd-lot" doctrine in 
the field of worker's compensation in many recent decisions. 
In Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc. et al., 622 P.2d 790, (Utah, 
1980) plaintiff had spent thirty years as a truck driver. In 
August of 1975, he injured his back in a non-industrial accident, 
which led to surgery later that year. In Obtober, 1976, he had 
recovered sufficiently so he returned to his job as a truck 
driver. 
On June 18, 1977, Mr. Brundage injured his back during the 
course and scope of his employment while unloading potatoes from 
his truck in Madison, Iowa. On August 1, 1977, he again underwent 
surgery on his back. Following his surgery, his back steadily 
improved until December, 1977. At that time, he re-injured his 
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back after catching his heel on a rug in his home. He was unable 
to return to work thereafter. 
The Utah Industrial Commission found Mr. Brundage suffered 
from an overall impairment of 30% - 15% of which was attributable 
to the industrial accident and 15% of which was attributable to 
nonindustrial causes. Mr. Brundage was awarded permanent partial 
impairment benefits accordingly. However, the Industrial 
Commission denied his claim for permanent total disability. 
In reversing the Commissions' ruling regarding the permanent 
total disability, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In his treatise The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, Professor Arthur Larson states: 
"Total disability" in compensation law is not 
be interpreted literally as utter and abject 
helplessness.... The task is to phrase a rule 
delimiting the amount and character of work a 
[person] can be able to do without forfeiting 
his totally disabled status. 2 Larson, The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation Section 57.51 at 
10-107. This Court has recognized the 
principle that a workman may be found totally 
disabled if by reason of the disability 
resulting from his injury he cannot perform 
work of the general character he was 
performing when injured, or any other work 
which a [person] of his capabilities may be 
able to do or to learn to do.... United Park 
City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 
412, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 (1964) 
Another important recent decision is Marshall v. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, et al. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
Appellant Marshall was employed by Emery Mining Company as a 
maintenance mechanic in a coal mine. On January 25, 1980, he was 
leaving the mine in a minetrip which is a tractor-trailer 
outfitted with wooden seats. As the minetrip was leaving the 
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mine, it ran over a large lump of coal causing Mr. Marshall to 
bounce up and down on the seat. The bounce caused Mr. Marshall to 
suffer an injury to his back. 
After several months of conservative Medical treatment, Mr. 
Marshall underwent surgery on his back. Although the surgery 
reduced his pain, he was advised by his doctor he could not return 
to work. Mr. Marshall was 67 years of age at the time. 
The Industrial Commission awarded Mr. Marshall permanent 
partial disability compensation finding he sustained a 10% 
impairment due to the accident on January 25, 1980 and 15% due to 
pre-existing conditions. However, the Qommission refused his 
request for permanent total disability stating the primary reason 
he was unable to return to work was his age. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission 
ruling Mr. Marshall was entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
The Court defined permanent total disability as follows: 
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if 
by reason of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when injured, or 
any other work which a man of his capabilities 
may be able to do or to learn to do 
681 P.2d at 211 
The Court further stated: 
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, 
but in terms of the specific individual who 
has suffered a work-related injury. An injury 
to a hand would not cause the same degree of 
disability in a teacher, for example, as it 
would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing 
the loss of earning capacity, a constellation 
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of factors must be considered, only one of 
which is the physical impairment. Other 
factors are age, education, training and 
mental capacity. See Northwest Carriers v. 
Industrial Commission, supra, at 141; 
Morrison-Knudsen Const. Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 18 Utah 2d 390, 424 P.2d 138 
(1967). It is the unique configuration of 
these factors that together will determine the 
impact of the impairment on the individual's 
earning capacity. 
681 P.2d at 211 
In discussing the "odd-lot" doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court 
made the following observations: 
In Entwistle v. Wilkins, Utah, 626 P.2d 495 
(1981), this Court stated total disability 
does not mean "that the injured employee must 
be unable to do any work at all." 
The fact that an injured employee may be able 
to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional 
wages does not necessarily preclude a finding 
of total disability to perform the work or 
follow the occupation in which he was injured. 
His temporary disability may be found to be 
total if he can no longer perform the duties 
of the character required in his occupation 
prior to his injury. 
Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added). some employees, although disabled 
with regard to their pre-injury occupation, 
may be rehabilitated and employed again. 
U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-67 requires that 
the employee must cooperate with the division 
of vocational rehabilitation and that the 
division must find that the employee may not 
be rehabilitated before the Industrial 
Commission can order permanent total 
disability benefits. 
[5,6] Some employees, however, cannot be 
rehabilitated and even though not in a state 
of abject helplessness "can no longer perform 
the duties... required in [their] 
occupations[s]." Entwistle, supra, at 498. 
These employees fall into the so-called "odd-
lot" category. 
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Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted 
in virtually every jurisdiction, total 
disability may be found in the case of workers 
who, while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will not be 
employed regularly in any well-known branch of 
the labor market. 2 Larson, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation Section 57.51 at 10-
164.24 (1983) 
681 P.2d at 212 
Finally, the Court pointed out that the majority of odd lot 
cases are concerned with employees whose work involved physical 
labor, were 50 years of age and older, and had moderate or little 
education similarly to Mr. Ortiz. 
The most analogous case to the present case is Norton v. 
Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). Mr. Norton was 
employed as a coal miner for United States Steel Corporation in 
East Carbon, Utah for thirty nine years from the age of 16 until 
the age of 56. He was a physical laborer throughout those years. 
Norton was close to being illiterate. 
On August 10, 1977, Mr. Norton sustained a serious injury 
when a pulley malfunctioned causing a cable to fall striking him 
on the neck. The doctors initially diagnosed his condition as a 
contusion and he was instructed to wear a soft collar. Mr. Norton 
returned to work the following week. Because of persistent pain, 
he was given a myelogram in December which showed a herniated disc 
at C5-C6 interspace and right shoulder traumatic bursitis. He 
also had nerve root irritation at C6-C7. Mr. Norton underwent 
traction and continued treatment, but declined surgery. He 
returned to his old job in heavy labor. 
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Norton, in spite of continued pain and discomfort, worked 
until March, 1983, five and one half years after his accident* 
Prior to his industrial accident of August 10, 1977, Norton 
suffered a broken back at age 13 which resulted in degenerative 
disc disease, a fractured right ankle which resulted in severe 
arthritis, bilateral inguinal hernias, for which he had been in 
surgery three times, hyper acidity with history of duodenal ulcer 
and focal skin cancers. After the industrial accident, he 
developed additional impairments namely; tendovaginitis of the 
right little finger, pulmonary allergic bronchitis and 
hypertensive cardiovascular disease with cardiomyopathy aggravated 
by life-long obesity. 
The Administrative Law Judge found Norton had a 14% whole man 
impairment pre-existing the industrial accident, 10% due to the 
industrial accident which resulted in a combined impairment of 23% 
and a overall impairment of 31%. 
The Division of Vocational Rehabilitation found Norton was 
not a good candidate for rehabilitation. However, in spite of 
these factors, the Industrial Commission did not grant Norton's 
request for permanent total disability compensation noting that 
approximately 10% of his impairment post dated the industrial 
accident, that he continued to work for six years following the 
industrial accident and that his permanent total disability was 
not a consequence of the industrial accident. 
Again, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial 
Commission's ruling. The Court, citing its previous ruling in 
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Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
1986) held that the Industrial Commission had failed to carry out 
its responsibility in Norton. The Commission has the duty to not 
only consider physical impairment, but als<> such factors as age, 
sex, education, economic and social environment in determining 
whether an employee qualifies for permanent total disability 
compensation. 
The Court further instructed the Industrial Commission: 
With respect to the administrative law judge's 
finding that Norton's continued work for six 
years was proof that he was not permanently 
totally disabled in 1983, it should! be pointed 
out that the fact standing alorie does not 
foreclose Norton's claim. The administrative 
law judge correctly considered Norton's return 
to work as one factor to be weighed in 
determining his disability. He erred when he 
failed to consider the condition under which 
Norton continued his employment, as manifested 
by his finding f,the very fact that the 
applicant continued to work in underground 
mining for six years following his accident is 
convincing evidence that his accident did not 
render him permanently and totally disabled." 
Norton's decision to return to work did not 
automatically disqualify him from receiving 
permanent total disability benefits, where the 
facts indicate that throughout the remainder 
of his employ he was not restored to health. 
The evidence is undisputed that Norton spent 
the last six of his working years in 
considerable pain. Provided that a worker's 
disability was also analyzed within the 
framework of the odd-lot doctrine, case law 
dealing with the factor of substantial pain 
has generally held that "[a] worker who cannot 
return to any gainful employment without 
suffering substantial pain is entitled to 
compensation benefits for total disability. ft 
Comeaux v. Cameron Offshore Seryices, Inc. 
420 So.2d 1209 (La.App.1982). 
The presence of substantial pain may logically 
cause an injured worker to fall into this odd-
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lot category, inasmuch as it directly affects 
the probable dependability with which the 
injured worker can sell his services in a 
competitive labor market, undistorted by such 
factors as business booms, sympathy of a 
particular employer or friends, temporary 
luck, or the superhuman efforts of the 
claimant to rise above his crippling 
handicaps. 
Calogero v. City of New Orleans, 397 So.2d 
1252, 1254 (La.1980), modified 434 So.2d 177 
(La.1983) (benefits affirmed on substantial 
pain theory alone), citing L.A. Larson, The 
Law of Workman's Compensation Section 10-
164.49 (1980) 
728 P.2d at 1027 
Finally, the Court stated: 
Upon remand the Commission is required to 
address Norton's disability in light of all 
factors mentioned ante, and the burden will be 
on the employer to prove the existence of 
regular, steady work that Norton could 
perform, taking into account his age, limited 
education, and functional illiteracy, as well 
as his disabling pain. Contrary to the 
Commission's disclaimer noted in Northwest 
Carriers at 140, n.3, permanent impairment 
alone is never the sole or real criterion of 
permanent disability, and a denial of 
permanent total disability based on it alone 
invites reversal under well-settled stare 
decisis. 
728 P.2d at 1020 
Still another very recent case is most similar to the case 
under consideration. In Peck v. EIMCO Process Equipment Co. 73 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1987), Mr. Peck was employed as an industrial 
maintenance mechanic for defendant. He suffered two industrial 
injuries which resulted in permanent partial impairment. On 
September 12, 1980, he injured his right knee which required 
surgical repair and resulted in a 2% impairment. The second 
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injury occurred on December 29, 1982 to his lower back which also 
required surgical repair. It resulted in a 10% impairment. Mr, 
Peck was then 63 years of age. 
Mr. Peck returned to work following his surgery with light 
duty restrictions on June 27, 1983. At age 65, he retired on 
April 28, 1984. He then requested he be found permanently, 
totally disabled and awarded compensation. 
The Administrative Law Judge ruled "with great reluctance" 
that Peck's impairment due to the industrial accidents as well as 
his pre-existing impairments entitled hirii to permanent total 
disability compensation. 
The Second Injury Fund filed a Motion for Review to the 
Industrial Commission. The Commission reversed the Administrative 
Law Judge and denied Peck permanent total disability compensation. 
The Utah Supreme Court overruled the Industrial Commission's 
decision and reinstated the Administrative Law Judge's ruling 
citing approvingly the Norton, Marshall, and Hardman decisions. 
The uncontroverted and clear evidence adduced in Mr. Ortiz' 
case demonstrates he is permanently and totally disabled as a 
consequence of his industrial accident and all other factors. The 
long line of Utah cases on this issue mandates the Utah Court of 
Appeals to find Mr. Ortiz is entitled to permanent total 
disability compensation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ortiz requests that he be found permanently totally 
disabled and awarded worker's compensation benefits accordingly. 
In the alternative it is his contention that a hearing on his 
Objections to the Medical Panel Report be ordered and that he be 
referred for vocatioDal rehabilitation evaluation. 
DATED this ^Jj day of February, 1988. 
Black 
Ex 
Susan/B. Diana 
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35-1-76 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
basis upon which to compute the weekly compensation rate. After the weekly 
compensation has been computed, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-75, enacted by I • 
1971, ch. 76, § 10; L. 1975, ch. 101, § 7; 1977, 
ch. 156, § 9; 1987, ch. 92, § 48. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amendment 
substituted "divided" for "multiplied" in subd. 
(l)(b); redesignated the subsection paragraph 
beginning "If none of the methods " as 
subsec. (3); and added subsec. (4). 
The 1977 amendment deleted "then be 
rounded to the nearest dollar and shall" after 
"it shall" in the first sentence of subsec. (4);' 
and added the last sentence to subsec. (4). 
'The 1987 amendment corrected the subsec-
tion designations. 
ANALYSIS 
Choice of subsection. 
Determination of amount. 
Employee with more than one job. 
Subsistence allowance. 
Choice of subsection. 
The question of which subsection of this sec-
tion should be applied in a given case is a 
mixed question of law and fact on which the 
supreme court will defer to the discretion of the 
commission as long as its decision is reason-
able and rational. Hodges v. Western Piling & 
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). 
Determination of amount. 
Finding that claimant intended to work only 
until he had earned $5,500 was supporter! by 
the evidence, even though claimant was work-
ing 40 hours per week at the time of his acci-
dent. Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 
717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). 
Employee with more than one job. 
Where employee was employed at two sepa-
rate jobs and was injured while working at one 
of the jobs, his v/eekly compensation rate was 
computed on the basis of the combined wages 
from his two employments. Produce v. Indus-
trial Comnx of Utah (Utah 1983) 657 P 2d 
1354. 
^u hsisu*nee aliowance. 
• the claimant worked at a jobsite that 
_-iant from his home, and the employer 
paid him a subsistence allowance in addition to 
his regular watfe, the subsistence allowance 
could not be included for the purpose of deter-
mining the claimant's average wage. Blake 
Stevens Constr. v. Henion (Utah 1985) 697 P 
2d 230. 
35-1-76. Likelil,. I ' h HI I mi in i I In 1 1 | " i < t i M * I I I H ' "i-idt t't i l , 
Limitation on expected wage increases. 
Commission acted within its powers in limit-
ing its consideration of adult worker's expected 
wage increases to the wage scale of the job 
worker held when injured rather than consider 
the wages he might have received for any job 
that he might have reasonably expected to hold 
after the injury when the compensation bene-
fits awarded were what the worker had asked 
for in his original application for benefits. 
Probst v. Industrial Comm. (Utah 1978) 588 P 
2d 717. 
3JV 1 77. Medical panel — Discretionary authorii> of com-
mission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to repor t — Hearing — Expenses. 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer 
or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical 
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having 
the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel set forth in sec-
tion, 35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays 
'Ml 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-77 
and perform such tests, including post-mortem examinations where autho-
rized by the commission, as it may determine and thereafter make a report in 
writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and also 
make such additional findings as the commission may require. The commis-
sion shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel to the 
applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail with 
return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is deposited in 
the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the insurance 
carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If no objec-
tions are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted in 
evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report 
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the 
commission.yf objections to such report are filed the commission may set the 
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such hear-
ing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of 
the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and cross-examina-
tion. For good cause shown the commission may order other members of the 
panel, with or without the chairman, to be present at the hearing for exami-
nation and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report of the 
panel may be received as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in 
the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitt^B The ex-
penses of such study and report by the medical panel and of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the fund provided for by section 
35-1-68. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969, 
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41, 
§ 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1979 amendment 
substituted "applicant" for "claimant" in the 
third and fourth sentences; deleted "within 
thirty days" after "set the case for hearing" in 
the sixth sentence; and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
The 1982 amendment substituted "may" for 
"shall" in the first sentence; substituted "the 
commission may" in the sixth sentence for "it 
shall be the duty of the commission to"; and 
made minor changes in phraseology. 
ANALYSIS 
Function of medical panel. 
Mandatory referral to panel. 
Panel report as evidence. 
Qualifications of panel members. 
Referral to panel. 
—Discretion. 
Cited. 
Function of medical panel. 
It is the function of the medical panel to give 
the commission the benefit of its diagnosis re-
lating to those matters within its expertise, 
and not to infringe upon commission's respon-
sibility to decide the issues in a workmen's 
compensation case. IGA Food Fair v. Martin 
(Utah 1978) 584 P 2d 828. 
Mandatory referral to panel. 
This section is mandatory in its requirement 
that a medical panel shall be convened upon 
the filing of a claim for compensation for injury 
by accident, or for death, arising out of or in 
the course of employment when the employer 
or insurance carrier denies liability. Lipman v. 
Industrial Comm. (Utah 1979) 592 P 2d 616. 
Th> provision requiring the submission of 
the medical aspects of the case, including those 
involving causation, to a medical panel is man-
datory. Schmidt v. Industrial Comm. of Utah 
(Utah 1980) 617 P 2d 693. 
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Panel report as evidence. 
Although all other evidence and testimony 
indicated that the plaintiff was totally dis-
abled, report of the medical panel that plaintiff 
had suffered a 50% permanent partial disabil-
ity is sufficient to support finding of industrial 
commission of a partial disability. Shipley v. C 
& W Contracting Co. (Utah 1974) 528 P 2d 
153. 
It is the duty of the commission to consider 
not only the medical panel report, but also all 
of the other evidence, and to draw whatever 
inferences and deductions that can be fairly 
and reasonably derived therefrom in reaching 
a decision on the issues. IGA Food Fair v Mar-
tin (Utah 1978) 584 P 2d 828. 
Although medical panel report did not link 
employee's heart attack with the stress he had 
experienced four days earlier at his job, the 
commission's finding that there was a causal 
connection between the stress and the subse-
quent heart attack was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious and not without any substantial evi-
dence to support it where a cardiologist testi-
fied that there was in fact a causal link be-
tween the stress and the heart attack Pitts 
burgh Testing Laboratory < Keller (Utah 
1983) 657 P 2d 1367. 
Qualifications of panel members. 
Statutory requirement that medical panel 
member specialize in "treatment of the dis-
ease" was met where practice consisted of 
representing businesses and teaching, even 
though physician did not actually treat pa 
tients on an appointment basis. Edwards v 
Tillery (Utah 198Ti 671 P 2d 195 
Referral to panel 
—Discretion. 
As the evidence of the causal connection be 
tween an employee lifting a very heavy beam 
and the perforation of his ulcer was not uncer-
tain or highly technical, the failure to refer the 
case to a medical panel was not an abuse of 
discretion. Champion Home Bldrs. v. Indus 
trial Comm'n (Utah 1985) 703 P 2d 306. 
Cited m Hone v J.F Shea Co, 728 P 2d 
1008 (Utah 1986); Greyhound Lines \ W.il 
lace, 728 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1986) 
•Ifi-1 - i'fi Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modil • 
award — Authority to destroy records — Intere^ 
on award. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be con-
tinuing, and it may from time to time make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings, or orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion may 
be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, other than 
those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 
35-1-99, which have been closed and inactive for a poriod of 10 years, may be 
destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the 
rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would hive 
otherwise become due and payable. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 83; C.L. 1917, Compiler's Notes. - The I MSI <IIIHMIII(III TII 
§ 3144; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-72; L. 1961, added the last paragraph 
ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1981, ch. 287, < 5, 
ANALYSIS 
Basis ot modification. 
Continuing medical expenses. 
Discretion of commission 
Interest. 
Interest on past-due benefits. 
— Retroactive application. 
Interest on settlements 
Record keeping. 
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>** , .». Permanent tot^l disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Vocational rehabilitation — Proce-
dure and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 
18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed 
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. However, in no case.of permanent total disability shall the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation 
payments for more than 312 weeks. A finding by the commission of perma-
nent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such 
time as the following proceedings have been had: If the employee has tenta-
tively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be manda-
tory that the industrial commission of Utah refer the employee to the divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for 
rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to order 
paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the 
rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training 
of the employee shall generally follow the practice applicable under 
§ 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having combined in-
juries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of 
education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that the 
employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabilitation 
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there 
be paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out 
of the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such 
period of time beginning with the time that the payments, as in this section 
provided, to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and 
ending with the death of the employee. No employee shall be entitled to 
any such benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate with the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under this section. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1 -67 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to 
benefits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), includ-
ing those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than $120 
per week when paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with 
compensation payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational 
training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the 
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission 
shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, deter-
mine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sus-
tained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, consti-
tutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the 
provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disa-
bility is required in those instances. In all other cases where there has been 
rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the 
award shall be based upon partial permanent disability,, 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917, 
S 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, 
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 
1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 
57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 
1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 
68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5; 
1971, ch. 76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. 
13, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6; 
1979, ch. 138, § 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, 
ch. 356, § 1; 1985, ch. 160, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amend-
ment substituted "85% of the state average 
weekly wage" for "662/3% of the state average 
weekly wage" four times in the first para-
graph and once in the last paragraph; in-
creased the minimum benefit per week from 
$35 to $45 in the first paragraph; inserted 
"not to exceed the average weekly wage of 
the employee at the time of the injury" twice 
in the first paragraph; increased the benefit 
per week from $50 to $60 at the end of the 
third paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment) and near the end of the fourth para-
graph (deleted by the 1977 amendment); and 
substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July 1, 1974" 
in the fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 
amendment). 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 sub-
stituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first para-
graph. 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151; combined the first two para-
graphs into one paragraph; inserted the sec-
ond paragraph; and deleted the former third 
and fourth paragraphs which read: "Com-
mencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are 
permanently and totally disabled and on that 
date or prior thereto were receiving compen-
sation benefits from the special fund provided 
for by section 35-1-68(1) shall be paid com-
pensation benefits at the rate of S60 per 
week. 
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons whoi 
were permanently and totally disabled on orj 
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving 
compensation benefits and continue to re*| 
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surveys were tied, was located in the same 
place during the time the surveys were 
made, therefore, the principle upon which 
defendants rely is inapplicable. Unless 
there is some basis for an estoppel, an ad-
joining landowner can generally by commis-
sioning his own survey, challenge the accu-
racy of the boundary line established by 
another surveyor.4 Under the survey ac-
cepted by the trial court, the boundaries of 
defendants' land coincide in length with 
those in the description in their deed.5 De-
fendants have failed to establish any basis 
upon which they could claim title to a por-
tion of plaintiffs' land. 
[3] Defendants further contend the trial 
* • ~t erred in striking the testimony of one 
less, Christensen. The witness was 
•d by defendants to interpret the field 
notes of Aspen Engineering, the surveyor in 
1970. During the trial, defense counsel 
stated that the witness was not called to 
testify as an expert surveyor but as an 
officer of Aspen Engineering, who had ac-
cess to the business records, for the witness 
had not participated in the survey. 
The field notes were already in evidence, 
and defense counsel's purpose in calling the 
witness was to have him interpret them. 
Since the witness was neither testifying as 
an expert nor had personal knowledge of 
the survey, the trial court did not err in 
striking his testimony.6 
CROCKETT, .-. j - __ ..._ 
STEWART, JJ., Lwui . 
WILKINS, J., heard the argument but 
resigned before the opinion wras filed. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
4. Davis v. Davis, 111 Utah 324, 178 P.2d 394 
(1947); Stratford v. Wood, 11 Utah 2d 251, 358 
P.2d 80 (1961). 
Harley R. BRUNDAGE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
IML FREIGHT, INC., Special Fund of 
Utah, and The Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Defendants. 
No 16972. 
Supreme. Court of Utah 
Dec, 18, 1980. 
Workers compensation claimant ap-
pealed from order of the Industrial Com-
mission which determined that he was suf-
fering 30% permanent partial bodily disabil-
ity. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held 
that in face of testimony that claimant was 
unable to sit or stand for any prolonged 
period of time, among other restrictions, 
and that there was no occupation presently 
available to claimant, none of which evi-
dence was contradicted, and in light of fail-
ure of defendants to show that plaintiff 
could obtain or perform the duties of em-
ployment of a special nature, the Commis-
sion could not have formed a bona fide 
opinion that plaintiff was not then incapa-
ble of reentering the labor market by rea-
son of physical disabilities, 
Remanded. 
Hall, J., concurred specially and filed 
opinion... 
1. Workers'" Compensation <s=> 1939.11(9) 
Determination as to permanent disabil-
ity is factual question for Industrial Com-
mission to resolve, and that determination 
will not be set aside by the Supreme Court 
unless there is no substantial evidence in 
record to support it. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-84, 
35-4-85. 
2. Workers* Compensation @=>1377 
In face of evidence that plaintiff was 
unable to sit or stand for any prolonged 
period of time, among other restrictions, 
that all of the restrictions were permanent, 
5. Ovard v. Cannon, Utah,. 600 P„2d 1246 (1979). 
6. See Rule 56(1), U.R.E. 
BRUNDAGE v. IML FREIGHT, INC. 
Cite as, Utah, 622 P.2d 790 
Utah 791 
iiat based on plaintiff's limitations 
was no occupation presently available 
lintiff, none of which evidence was 
idicted, it became incumbent upon de-
nts in workers' compensation case to 
that plaintiff was able to secure em-
lent of special nature not generally 
ible or that he was able to perform 
; of such employment. 
>rkers' Compensation @=>1639 
n face of testimony that plaintiff was 
e to sit or stand for any prolonged 
1 of time, among other restrictions, 
ill of the restrictions were permanent, 
hat there was no occupation presently 
ible to plaintiff, none of which evi-
was contradicted, and in light of fail-
\f defendants to show that plaintiff 
obtain or perform duties of employ-
of a special nature, Industrial Com-
>n could not have formed bona fide 
>n that plaintiff was not then incapa-
f reentering the labor market by rea-
f physical disabilities. U.C.A.1953, 35-
nes R. Black of Black & Moore, Salt 
City, for appellant. 
oert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Frank V. 
>n, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert W. Brandt, 
Lake City, for respondent. 
LKINS, Justice: 
is is an appeal by Plaintiff Harley R. 
dage from an order of the Industrial 
nission which determined that he is 
ring a 30 percent permanent partial 
y disability. Plaintiff maintained be-
the Commission and again on appeal 
he is permanently and totally disabled. 
tintiff has spent thirty years of his life 
truck driver, the most recent 17 of 
i he was employed by Defendant IML 
fht, Inc. In August of 1975, plaintiff 
ed his back in an accident unrelated to 
mployment. In October of that year, 
iderwent surgery to remove interverte-
disc material at the L3^4 level in his 
He recovered sufficiently from the 
-ry to pass an Interstate Commerce 
Commission physical examination in Octo-
ber of 1976. He thereafter resumed his 
driving duties for IML. 
On June 18, 1977, plaintiff again injured 
his back while unloading potatoes from his 
truck in Madison, Iowa. He completed his 
scheduled run to Chicago and was flown 
back to Salt Lake City from there the day 
following the accident. On August 1, 1977, 
he again underwent surgery on his back 
Following the surgery, plaintiffs condition 
steadily improved until December of 1977 
At that time he reinjured his back after 
catching his heel on a rug in his home. He 
has been unable to return to work since 
then. 
On November 20, 1978, plaintiff filed an 
application for hearing with the Industrial 
Commission. An initial evidentiary hearing 
was held before an Industrial Commission 
administrative law judge on January 25, 
1979. Both plaintiff and a clinical psycholo-
gist, who had examined and tested plaintiff, 
testified. Following that hearing the ad-
ministrative law judge referred plaintiff to 
Richard Olsen, a rehabilitation counselor 
with the Division of Rehabilitation Services, 
for the purpose of evaluating plaintiff's po-
tential for rehabilitation and placement in a 
new occupation. 
A second hearing was held on January 14, 
1980. At that hearing two physicians who 
had examined plaintiff testified as to his 
physical condition and impairments. Mr. 
Olsen also testified as to his evaluation of 
plaintiffs prospects for rehabilitation and 
re-employment. Thereafter the administra-
tive law judge entered his findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order finding plain-
tiff 30 percent permanently partially dis-
abled—15 percent of that disability attrib-
utable to nonindustrial causes and 15 per-
cent to industrial causes—and ordered pay-
ment of certain benefits, but specifically 
found that plaintiff was not permanently 
and totally disabled. 
On motion for review filed by plaintiff, 
the entire Commission upheld the adminis-
trative law judge. It did so with one Com-
missioner voting to uphold the order of the 
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administrative law judge, one Commission 
er voting to reverse it and one Commission-
er not participating. 
[1] As this Court recently stated in the 
case of Clark v Interstate Homes, Inc.:l 
It is fundamental that a determination 
as to permanent disability is a factual 
question for the Commission to resolve, 
and that determination will not be set 
aside by this Court unless there is no 
substantial evidence in the record to sup-
port it, Evans v. Industrial Commission, 
28 Utah 2d 324, 502 P.2d 118 (1972); 
.• §§ 35-1-84 and 85, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended.2 
In his treatise The Law oi \Y-:.r'i-> 
Compensation, Professor Arihui ...i? r 
states: 
"Total disability" in compensation law 
is not to be interpreted literally as utter 
and abject helplessness. . . . The task is 
to phrase a rule delimiting the amount 
and character of work a [person] can be 
able to do without forfeiting his totally 
disabled status.3 
Consonant with the view expressed by 
Larson, this Court has adopted the follow 
ing definition of total disability: 
wourt has recognized the principle 
i workman may be found totally 
ed if by reason of the disability 
" "
j
 injury he cannot per-
j general character he 
MTtormmg when injured, or any oth-
,;; vurk which a [person] of his capabili-
ties may be able to do or to learn to 
do ' 
A review of the testimony heard by the 
administrative law judge reveals the follow-
ing with respect to plaintiffs physical and 
occupational limitations. Dr. Wayne He-
bertson, a neurologist, testified that plain-
1. Utah, 604 P.2d 937 (1979). 
2. Id. at 938. 
3. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensa-
tion, § 57.51 at 10-107. 
4. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 
Utah 2d 410, 412, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 (1964), 
cited in Clark v. Interstate Homes, Inc., supra, 
tiff is unable to sit or stand for any pro-
longed period of time, is restricted in stoop-
ing or bending, should lift no more than 15 
pounds and is restricted in walking and 
twisting. Doctor Hebertson testified that 
all of these restrictions are permanent and 
that because of the sitting and standing 
restrictions on plaintiff, it was difficult for 
the doctor to perceive that plaintiff might 
be able to engage even in sedentary voca-
tions, Richard Olsen, the rehabilitation 
counselor, testified that based on plaintiffs 
limitations, there is no occupation presently 
available to plaintiff, 
[2,3] A review of letters from various \ 
consulting physicians also found in the rec- \ 
ord indicates that they are unanimous in 
believing that plaintiff cannot return to 
being a truck driver, Furthermore, some of / 
these physicians also indicated that they J 
considered plaintiff unemployable. In the ! 
face of such evidence, none of which was 
contradicted, it then became \,?umbent I 
upon the defendants to show that plaintiff 
"is able to secure employment of a special 
nature not generally available or that he is 
able to perform the duties of such employ-
ment."5 Defendants adduced no such evi-
dence. Therefore there is no evidence in 
the record to support the finding of the 
administrative law judge that there was 
such special employment available to plain-
tiff. Here, as in the case of Buxton v. 
Industrial Commission* "the Commission 
could not have formed a bona fide opinion 
that plaintiff was not then incapable of 
re-entering the labor market by reason of 
physical disabilities. . . " 7 
The order of the Industrial Commission is 
reversed. Section 35-1-67, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended, prescribes the 
procedure which is to be followed in cases 
of permanent disability. That section re-
quires that: 
at 938. See, also, Caitlet v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936). 
5. Caillet v. Industrial Commission, supra, 90 
Utah at 15, 58 P.2d at 763. 
6. I Jtah, 587 P.2d 121 (1978),, 
7. Id,, at 123-124. 
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manent total disability shall in all casss 
be tentative and not final until such time 
as the following proceedings have been 
had: Where the employee has tentatively 
been found to be permanently and totally 
disabled it shall be mandatory that the 
industrial commission of Utah refer such 
employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of 
education for rehabilitation training . . . 
If and when the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of 
education certifies to the industrial com-
mission of Utah and in writing that such 
employee has fully co-operated with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation in its 
efforts to rehabiUtate him, and m the 
opinion of the division the employee may 
not be rehabilitated, then the commission 
shall order that there be paid to such 
employee weekly benefits . . . 
The record discloses that plaintiff was 
referred to the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services for a determination of whether he 
could be rehabilitated. Mr. Olsen testified 
that plaintiff could not be rehabilitated but 
the record does not contain a written certi-
fication of that fact as required by Section 
35-1-67. Further, the question of alloca-
tion between defendant [ML and the "spe-
cial fund" of any additional benefits paid to 
plaintiff should be handled according to the 
dictates of Section 35-1-69. 
This matter is accordingly remanded to 
the Commission for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion and the require-
ments of the applicable statutes. Our dis-
position of this matter renders unnecessary 
discussion of the other points raised by 
plaintiff on appeal. No costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., STEWART, J., and 
KENNETH RIGTRUP, District Judge, con-
cur. 
MAUGHAN, 
herein. 
J., does not participate 
HALL, Justice (concurring specially): 
I agree that it tentatively appears th&t 
plaintiff may be permanently and totally 
pursuant to U.C.A., 
1953, 35-1-67, the final determination 
thereof is not to be made until such time as 
plaintiff has fully cooperated with the divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation in its ef-
forts to rehabilitate him. Of course, bene-
fits may only be paid at such time as, in the 
opinion of the division, the employee cannot 
be rehabilitated. 
UTAH BANK & TRUST, a Utah Corpo-
ration, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
James H. QUINN and James H. Quinn, 
Jr., Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 16788. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 29, 1980. 
Creditor brought action against debtor 
and his guarantor for deficiency judgment 
after sale of debtors inventory collateral. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Dean E. Conder, J., entered judgment for 
creditor, and debtors appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Wahlquist, District Judge, 
held that: (1) evidence in action by creditor 
for deficiency judgment after sale by credi-
tor of debtor's used-car inventory, including 
fact that book value as applied to debtor's 
inventory was speculative, as the cars were 
"exotic," and would only receive book value 
if in excellent condition, which they were 
not, was sufficient to support finding that 
the sales were done in a reasonable manner; 
and (2) although creditor did not abide by 
Uniform Commercial Code requirement 
that it give written notice of sales of collat-
eral to debtor, trial court did not err in 
determining, in lieu of automatically bar-
ring creditor from obtaining a deficiency 
judgment for failure to give notice of sales, 
ENTWISTLE V. WILKINS 
AM application of the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act to stock gifts and found ap-
Irtpriate "the more flexible rules of person-
Kproperty law in ascertaining whether or 
not a gift was consummated." [214 P.2d at 
115.1 See also McClements v. McClements, 
411 Pa. 257, 191 A.2d 814 (1963), in which 
•Jje transfer of ownership on the corporate 
jtooks along with evidence of donative in-
tent satisfied the delivery requirement. 
We are unpersuaded that the statutory 
.requirements governing commercial stock 
transactions are conclusive in establishing 
the rights of parties involved in gift trans-
actions, and we therefore hold that manual 
delivery of the stock certificates personally 
to Rod was not a prerequisite to a valid 
gift. 
Viewing the facts of this case in light of 
the requirements of inter vivos gifts, we 
find the gifts of stock to Rod were complete 
and valid. Evidence of decedent's intention 
thaf Rod be made the owner of the stock in 
question during his lifetime was uncontro-
verted. Appellants do not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to donative 
intent nor the. finding of the trial court that 
the change in ownership was recorded on 
the corporate books. New certificates were 
issued in Rod's name. The decedent did not 
thereafter exercise control over the stocks. 
On the contrary, Rod voted the stock as its 
legal owner and received cash and stock 
dividends. 
The fact that the stock certificates were 
kept in a safe to which decedent, but not 
Rod, had access is not fatal to the finding of 
a completed gift. The decedent had physi-
cal possession of stock certificates belong-
ing to a number of other Ross family mem-
bra. There was no assertion or evidence 
that he exerted control or possessory rights 
over any of that stock. His custody of 
Rod's stock was simply consistent with the 
Practice within the family businesses of 
Keeping the stock certificates in a central 
taction clearly identified as to the owners 
t n e
 shares. Individual envelopes carried 
owners' names, stock certificate numbers, 
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We find no er^or in the trial court's inter-
pretation of the evidence or its application 
of Utah law in reaching the conclusion that 
the inter vivos gifts to Rod were valid. 
This conclusion was based on evidence that 
not only meets the clear and convincing 
standard but is virtually undisputed. 
Affirmed. Costs to Respondent. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEW-
ART and OAKS, JJ., concur. 
ENTWISTLE COMPANY and Home 
Insurance Company. Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Jerry M. WILKINS and Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Defendants. 
No. 16879. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 26, 1981. 
Employer and carrier sought reversal 
of order by Industrial Commission which 
awarded temporary total disability compen-
sation to claimant for accidental injuries 
claimant suffered arising out of driving a 
truck for employer. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that: (1) "total disabili-
ty," with respect to a workers' compensa-
tion proceeding, does not mean a state of 
abject helplessness, or that the injured em-
ployee must be unable to do any work at 
all; fact that an injured employee may be 
able to do some kinds of tasks to earn 
occasional wages does not necessarily pre-
clude a finding of total disability to per-
form the work or |follow the occupation in 
which he was injured, and (2) evidence sup-
ported finding by Industrial Commission 
o the number of shares represented by that claimant suffered a temporary total 
e certificates. disability, despite fact that he did not re-
^R 
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main completely idle during the relevant 
period, but spent some time in helping with 
a family business. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
Croft, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Workers' Compensation @=>863 
Purpose of temporary disability com-
pensation is to provide income for employee 
during the time of recuperation from his 
injury and until his condition has stabilized. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>848 
"Total disability," with respect to a 
workers' compensation proceeding, does not 
mean a state of abject helplessness, or that 
the injured employee must be unable to do 
any work at all; fact that an injured em-
ployee may be able to do some kinds of 
tasks to earn occasional wages does r^t 
necessarily preclude a finding of total dis-
ability to perform the work or follow the 
occupation in which he was injured. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Workers' Compensation <s=>1653 
Evidence m workers' compensation pro-
ceeding, including testimony by claimant 
that following his work-related back injury, 
he was unable to perform the work required 
of a salesman, and that he was not trained 
to work in any other occupation, supported 
finding by Industrial Commission that 
claimant suffered a temporary total disabil-
ity, despite fact that he did not remiain 
completely idle during the relevant period, 
but spent some time in helping with a fami-
ly business. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>1723 
Extent and duration of an employee's 
disability are questions of fact to be deter-
mined by the Industrial Commission. 
5. Workers' Compensation <&=>1935, 1939.-
4(4) 
Supreme Court will review evidence in 
workers' compensation proceeding in the 
light most favorable to the Industrial Com-
mission's findings, and when there is sub-
stantial evidence to support the facts as 
found by the Commission, its order will not 
be disturbed. 
J. Kent Holland, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs. 
Paul R. Frischknecht, Manti, Robert B. 
Hansen and Frank V. Nelson, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants. 
CROCKETT, Justice: * 
Plaintiffs Entwistle Company and its in-
surer, Home Insurance Company, seek re-
versal of an order by the Industrial Com-
mission which awarded temporary total dis-
ability compensation to the defendant Jerry 
Wilkins caused by an accidental injury suf-
fered by him arising out of his driving a 
truck for plaintiff Entwistle. 
Plaintiffs contend that after the defend-
ant's injury and his subsequent termination 
of employment with plaintiff Entwistle, he 
performed work "of the same general char-
acter" during the period of time for which 
he was awarded the above compensation 
and that the award should not have been 
made. 
The facts, as found by the Commission, 
are: The defendant, who is 55 years old, 
sold trailers and other types of recreational 
vehicles for plaintiff Entwistle. In that 
capacity, he regularly traveled throughout 
the western states contacting dealers. On 
April 15, 1977, near Portland, Oregon, his 
pickup truck and a trailer he was pulling 
were forced off the road and into a borrow 
pit by strong winds. To get back on the 
highway, the defendant had to unhitch the 
trailer. In doing so, he lost his balance, fe" 
over and struck his back on some large 
rocks. This caused severe pain in his lower 
back and some numbness in his left leg* 
After a short rest, he was able to hook tfp 
the trailer and continue his trip. 
The next day, the defendant informed his 
boss of the accident and indicated that, 
* CROCKETT, J , wrote this opinion prior to his 
retirement 
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although he was injured and the trailer was 
damaged, he would complete the sales trip 
as scheduled. A week later, however, he 
notified his boss that he was in so much 
pain that he would return home earlier than 
scheduled. 
The defendant arrived home on April 27 
and continued to experience pain in his 
lower back. The next day, he was exam-
ined by a doctor who referred him to an 
orthopedic specialist. For the next three 
weeks, the defendant underwent physical 
therapy. He returned to work on May 20. 
At that time, he restricted his duties to 
contacting dealers by telephone. Neverthe-
less, when he was unable to do that because 
of continuing pain, plaintiff Entwistle ter-
minated his employment. 
The defendant applied for disability com-
pensation and, after a hearing, the matter 
was referred to a medical panel.1 The pan-
el reported that the defendant has a condi-
tion of intermittent pain in his lower back 
and numbness in his left thigh and foot and 
that it is aggravated when he stands or sits 
for extended periods of time. The panel's 
opinion is that the defendant was temporar-
ily totally disabled from April 15, 1977, un-
til January 1, 1978, that his condition had 
then stabilized, and that there was a ten 
percent permanent loss of body function as 
a result of the accident. 
Based on the above facts, the administra-
tive law judge entered an order, dated Oc-
tober 25, 1979, awarding the defendant 
temporary total disability compensation of 
"$169 per week from April 15, 1977, to 
January 1, 1978, for a total of 37 weeks, 3 
days for the sum of $6,325.43." 2 The plain-
tiffs filed a motion for review of that order. 
It is important to have in mind that the 
plaintiffs do not complain of the ten per-
cent permanent partial disability award, 
but their attack is upon the temporary total 
disability award, and that is the problem we 
are dealing with. 
*• Pursuant to Sec 35-1-77, U C A 1953 
2. The defendant was also awarded permanent 
partial disability compensation totaling 
$3,515 30 
On December 11, 1979, the Commission 
amended the October 25 order, noting that 
between April 15 and May 23, the defend-
ant received his regular salary and, thus, 
was not entitled to temporary disability 
benefits during that time. Consequently, 
the Commission made the appropriate ad-
justment by reducing the award by five 
weeks and two days. Nevertheless, the 
plaintiffs have persisted in contending that 
no award at all for temporary total disabili-
ty was justified. 
The basis of plaintiff's argument is that 
after the defendant's employment with 
(plaintiff Entwistle ended, he performed 
Identical work for a camper shell manufac-
turing company owned by himself and his 
son. They point to evidence that, during 
the summer of 1977, the defendant made 
two or three sales trips for that company 
a^ nd delivered camper shells to dealers who 
s^ )ld the company's products. They say that 
this conclusively shows that the defendant 
Was able to perform work of the same gen-
eral nature as he had before the accident 
and, thus, was not eligible for the tempo-
rary total compensation which he received. 
[1] The purpose of temporary disability 
compensation is to provide income for an 
employee during the time of recuperation 
from his injury and until his condition has 
stabilized.3 The question as to the degree 
of his disability on a temporary basis may 
be quite different than that question as to 
partial or total permanent disability. The 
lakv should not and does not encourage indo-
lence by requiring that a man be completely 
idje in order to remain eligible for disability 
compensation. We have heretofore stated 
that: 
a workman may be found totally 
disabled if by reason of the disability 
Resulting from his injury, he cannot per-
form work of the general character he 
was performing when injured, or any oth-
3. Granado v Workmen's Comp Appeals Bd, 
71 Cal Rptr 678, 445 P 2d 294 (1968), Taylor v 
State Accident Ins Fund, 40 Or App 437, 595 
P2d 515 (1979), Vetter v Alaska Workmen's 
Qomp Bd, Alaska, 524 P2d 264 (1974) 
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er work which a man of his capabilities 
may be able to do or to learn to do.4 
But common sense dictates that there is less 
reason to expect that a man will readjust to 
different work during a period of tempo-
rary disability than he would on the perma-
nent basis. 
[2] As applied to the issue under consid-
eration here, "total disability" does not 
mean a state of abject helplessness5 or that 
the injured employee must be unable to do 
any work at all.6 The fact that an injured 
employee may be able to do some kinds of 
tasks to earn occasional wages does not 
necessarily preclude a finding of total dis-
ability to perform the work or follow the 
occupation in which he was injured.7 His 
temporary disability may be found to be 
total if he can no longer perform the duties 
of the character required in his occupation 
prior to his injury.8 
[3-5] The defendant testified that, be-
cause of the pain he was experiencing, he 
could not perform the work required of a 
•salesman and that he was not trained for 
work in any other occupation. The sales 
trips he made were infrequent and of short 
duration, usually for only one day; and 
thus, not comparable to the extended trav-
eling of his regular employment. He said 
that his involvement with the family busi-
ness consisted primarily of visits to the 
plant to assist with making out payrolls or 
paying bills. He did not consider his partic-
ipation to be of any substantial conse-
4. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 
Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 (1964); 
Morrison-Knudson Const Co. v. Industrial 
Com'n., 18 Utah 2d 390, 424 P.2d 138 (1967). 
5. Thomas v. Industrial Com'n., 95 Utah 32, 79 
P.2d 1 (1938). See E. R. Moore Co. v. Industri-
al Com'n., 71 I11.2d 353, 17 Ill.Dec. 207, 376 
N.E.2d 206 (1978). 
6. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, Tex.Civ.App., 534 
S.W.2d 720 (1976). 
7. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, sec. 57.-
12. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Rauh, 
Okl., 318 P.2d 864 (1957); £ R. Moore Co. v. 
Industrial Com'n., supra, note 5; Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Industrial Com'n., 76 Ill.2d 
197, 28 Ill.Dec. 548, 390 N.E.2d 907 (1979); 
quence. The fact that he did not remain 
completely idle, but spent some time in 
helping with the family business is not in-
consistent with the finding that his injury 
temporarily prevented him from perform-
ing his usual line of work. Significantly, as 
to when the defendant was able to return 
to work in any capacity, the medical panel 
reported as follows: 
The applicant was able to return to 
full-time work January 1, 1978. The 
members of the medical panel recognize 
that this man was carrying out signifi-
cant personal business a good part of the 
time . . . and might by someone be con-
sidered during that time as being able to 
work part-time. It is the opinion of the 
Panel, however, that he was substantially 
disabled for significant employment by 
another party during that period. [All 
emphasis added.] 
In considering the plaintiffs' attack upon 
the order made, we apply the principles 
which are established in such matters. The\ 
extent and the duration of an employee's 
disability are questions of fact to be deter- ^ 
mined by the Commission.9 We review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commission's findings,10 and when there is 
substantial evidence to support the facts as 
found by the Commission, its order will noty 
be disturbed.11 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
STEWART, and HOWE, JJ., concur. 
Jones v. Arnold, La.App., 371 So.2d 1258 
(1979). 
8. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, supra, note 6. 
9. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, su-
pra, note 4; E. R. Moore Co. v. Industrial 
Com'n., supra, note 5. 
10. Sec. 35-1-85, U.C.A.1953; Vause v. Indus-
trial Com'n., 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006 
(1965); Duaine Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Indus-
trial Com'n, 29 Utah 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743 
(1973); Savage v. Industrial Com'n., Utah, 565 
P.2d 782 (1977). 
11. Sanderson v. Industrial Com'n., 16 Utah 2d 
348, 400 P.2d 756 (1965). That this rule also 
applies to the Commission's refusal to find 
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HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
I of course agree that questions of fact 
are to be determined by the Commission. 
However, the record in this case reveals 
that none of the material facts are in dis-
pute. The Commission was simply called 
upon to apply the law to those facts and 
thus determine whether defendant was to-
tally disabled. 
The services defendant performed for 
plaintiff Entwistle Company was the selling 
of trailers, which included sales trips to 
various dealers. The services he performed 
for himself and his son were sales of camp-
er shells, which also included sales trips, 
although of lesser frequency and distance. 
The legal test of total disability as an-
nounced by this Court in United Park City 
Mines Company v. Prescott, et a/,,1 is 
whether one can perform work of the gen-
eral character he was performing when in-
jured. 
I am of the opinion that there is little 
distinction to be made between traveling 
for the purpose of making sales of trailers 
and performing like services in the sale of 
camper shells. Consequently, I find no sub-
stantial evidence in the record to support 
the conclusion of the Commission that de-
fendant was totally disabled. 
I would set aside the order of the Com-
mission. 
CROFT, District Judge (dissenting): 
I concur in the dissent of Justice Hall 
that there is no substantial evidence in the 
record to support the conclusion of the 
Commission that defendant Wilkins was to-
tally disabled following his accident of April 
15, 1977, until January 1, 1978. I am satis-
fied that defendant was injured in his fall 
from the truck on April 15, 1977, with a 
resulting and recurring pain in his back in 
the weeks that followed. I am not satisfied 
that the injury resulted in any more than a 
temporary partial disability. 
facts, see Halvorson, Inc. v. Williams, 19 Utah 
2d 113,426 P.2d 1019 (1967). 
*• 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 (1964). 
1- Sec. 35-1-65(1), U.C.A.1953. 
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We are here dealing with the question as 
Ito whether the evidence presented to the 
Commission supports its finding of tempo-
rary total disability of Wilkins up to Janu-
ary 1, 1978. 
Under our law, in case of temporary dis-
ability, the compensation provided for by 
statute is payable "so long as such disability 
is total."1 I find no definition of "total 
disability" in our statutes. Whether an em-
ployee is totally disabled is an ultimate 
ttatter to be decided by the Commission.2 
he function of a medical panel is to give 
the Commission the benefit of its diagnosis 
relating to those matters within its exper-
ise, and not to infringe upon the Commis-
ion's responsibility to decide the issue of 
iotal disability.3 
What is "total disability"? I agree with 
Justice Crockett's statement that it does 
not mean a state of abject helplessness or 
that the injured employee must be unable 
to do any work at all. I do not agree that 
the test is met if the employee "can no 
lpnger perform the duties of a character 
required in his occupation prior to his inju-
99 C.J.S., Sec. 304(b), Workmen's Com-
pensation, states that temporary total dis-
ability is the healing period or period during 
which "the claimant is unable to work and 
is totally disabled and recovery is reason-
ably expected." In Caillet v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 
(^936), Justice Wolfe, in his dissenting opin-
ion, said: 
Temporary totai disability is founded on 
actual disability, 
and further that total disability means 
disablement of the particular applicant to 
earn wages in the type of work (not just 
the particular work he did do) he was 
trained for or any other type of work 
2. Spencer v. Industrial Com'n, 87 Utah 336, 40 
P.2d 188 (1935). 
3. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, Utah, 584 P.2d 828 
(1978). 
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which a person of his mentality and at-
tainments could do. 
Justice Wolfe also stated that he did not 
think the doctors are competent to give 
testimony on whether an applicant is eco-
nomically totally disabled. 
It seems to me that in the case before 
this Court that is exactly what the medical 
panel did. In the quote from the medical 
panel report cited by Justice Crockett, it 
was stated that the panel recognized that 
defendant was carrying out significant per-
sonal business a good portion of the time, 
particularly following the fire (August 29, 
1977), and undoubtedly some of the time 
prior to the fire, and might by someone be 
considered during that time as being able to 
work part-time, but that in the opinion of 
the panel, he was "substantially disabled" 
for significant employment by another par-
ty during that period. As was stated in 
IGA Food Fair v. Martin (supra), that im-
presses me as but "a gratuitous conclusion 
upon a matter of fact unrelated to its medi-
cal expertise." 
Wilkins* activities before the fire noted 
by Justice Hall in his dissent involved trav-
eling and making sales and deliveries of 
camper shells. This activity was terminat-
ed by the destruction of the business by 
fire, not by the pain defendant said he felt 
as he watched his business being destroyed 
by the uncontrollable flames. The exam-
ining physician's report on the pain felt 
after the fire was "recurrent back strain 
again today with the fire fighting and 
clearance of things." 
The medical panel report recites that af-
ter the fire, and during September, October 
and November, Wilkins spent a good deal of 
time visiting bankers and doing other 
things trying to get back into business. No 
visits to the doctors occurred during those 
three months. A visit on December 30, 
1977, to Dr. Pratt disclosed his problem 
then was "allergic rhinitis," which the dic-
tionary 4 defines as an "inflammation of the 
nose or its mucous membrane." Dr. Pratt's 
4. Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language, The Unabridged Edition 
pencilled notation for that date also appears 
to state that his left leg was "becoming 
worse, muscle deterioration," yet the medi-
cal panel found his period of total disability 
ended the next day. 
I search the medical records of the two 
treating physicians in vain for any sugges-
tion that defendant was totally disabled. 
At most, one finds medication and a week 
or so of rest as the prescribed treatments. 
His activities following the loss of his em-
ployment until the end of 1977 as disclosed 
by the record falls far short of the "actual 
disability" test suggested by Justice Wolfe. 
Nor do I think the record sustains a finding 
that defendant could not "perform work of 
a general character he was performing 
when injured, or any other work which a 
man of his capabilities may be able to do or 
learn to do."5 
I would reverse the Commission's order 
and remand the case for further proceed-
ings to determine Wilkins' entitlement, if 
any, under Section 35-1-66 to relief for 
partial disability. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; CROFT, District Judge, sat. 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
D. Dale WILLIAMS, Director, Depart-
ment of Finance of State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 17000. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 27, 1981. 
Plaintiff appealed from the Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. 
5. Thomas v Industrial Com'n, see footnote 5 in 
Justice Crockett's opinion 
MARSHALL V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, ET AL 
44 
208 Utah 681 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
form provided by a social worker for the 
department. These opportunities exceed 
what is necessary to contradict either one 
of the two essential elements of the Ellis 
exception: it was (1) ''impossible" for the 
father to make a timely filing of the re-
quired notice (2) "through no fault of his 
own." 
In apparent reliance on the Ellis state-
ment that due process requires that the 
father be allowed to show "he was not 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to com-
ply with the statute/' the district court held 
that § 78-30-4(3) could not be applied to 
terminate the father's parental right in this 
case. Such an interpretation overlooks the 
fact that the "reasonable opportunity" re-
ferred to in the quoted sentence only ap-
plies "in such a case," i.e., when it is first 
shown that it was "impossible" for the 
fa tW to file "through no fault of his 
own." Otherwise, the need to prove in 
each adoption case that the unwed father— 
whoever he may be—had a "reasonable 
opportunity" to file the required notice of 
paternity would frustrate the statute's pur-
pose to facilitate secure adoptions by early 
clarification of status. 
In Lehr v. Robertson, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court rejected a similar 
argument: that the unwed father should 
have received special notice of the adoption 
proceeding because, on the facts of that 
case, the trial court and the parties knew 
that he had filed a separate proceeding to 
establish his parental rights. The Supreme 
Court declared: 
This argument amounts to nothing more 
than an indirect attack on the notice pro-
visions of the New York statute. The 
legitimate state interests in facilitating 
the adoption of young children and hav-
ing the adoption proceeding completed 
expeditiously that underlie the entire 
statutory scheme also justify a trial 
judge's determination to require all in-
terested parties to adhere precisely to 
the procedural requirements of the 
statute. .. Since the New York stat-
utes adequately protected appellant's in-
choate interest in establishing a relation-
ship with Jessica, we find no merit in 
the claim that his constitutional rights 
were offended because the family court 
strictly complied with the provisions of 
the statute. 
103 S.Ct. at 2995 (emphasis added). In 
applying that reasoning, the Court also not-
e4 that the right to receive notice of the 
adoption proceeding "was completely with-
in appellant's control." Id. 
We agree with the reasoning in Lehr v. 
Robertson, and we therefore hold that the 
agency correctly applied § 78-30-4(3) on 
th^ facts of this case and did not violate 
federal or state due process rights. 
The judgment is reversed, and the case is 
remanded with directions to enter judg-
ment for the defendants. Each party to 
bear own costs. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE an* 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Nolan W. MARSHALL, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Emery Mining Co., 
^Employer), and/or the State Insurance 
Fund of Utah, and the Second Injury 
Fund, Defendants. 
No. 19153. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 5, 1984. 
Mine employee denied permanent total 
disability benefits after work-related acci-
dent when he was 67 years old sought 
review of decision of the Industrial Com-
mission denying him such benefits. The 
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
totil disability for workers' compensation 
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purposes does not mean total physical im-
pairment, and (2) denial of permanent total 
disability benefits to mine employee, based 
almost entirely on size of employee's per-
centage of impairment and fact that em-
ployee was eligible to retire, rather than on 
evidence of employee's wage-earning ca-
pacity, was unsupported by the Commis-
sion's findings of fact, and would be set 
aside. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., dissented and filed an opin-
ion in which Howe, J., joined. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s»803 
"Disability," under the worker's com-
pensation laws, is loss of ability to earn. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation e=>836 
An undisputed physical impairment 
may not always result in a disability for 
worker's compensation purposes 
3. Workers' Compensation <s=>803 
In assessing loss of earning capacity 
from an injury for workers' compensation 
purposes, a constellation of factors must be 
considered, only one of which is physical 
impairment of the worker; other factors 
are age, education, training and mental ca-
pacity. 
4. Workers' Compensation <S=>847 
Total disability, for workers' compen-
sation purposes, does not mean total physi-
cal impairment. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
5. Workers' Compensation <s=*847 
Whether an employee falls into the 
odd-lot category, under which total disabili-
ty for workers' compensation purposes 
may be found in the case of workers who, 
while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will not 
be employed regularly in any well-known 
branch of the labor market, depends on 
whether there is regular, dependable work 
available for the employee, who does not 
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rely on sympathy of friends or his own 
superhuman efforts. 
6. Workers' Compensation <s»1377 
Once an employee who has suffered a 
work-related accident has presented evi-
dence that he can no longer perform the 
duties required in his occupation and that 
he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden 
shifts to the employer to prove the exist-
ence of regular, steady work that the em-
ployee can perform, taking into account the 
employee's education, mental capacity, and 
age, to avoid finding that the employee is 
totally and permanently disabled under the 
odd-lot doctrine. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
7. Workers' Compensation <§>1947 
Supreme Court may set aside an In-
dustrial Commission's award in a workers' 
compensation case if the Commission's 
findings of fact do not support the award. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-84. 
8. Workers' Compensation <£=>1653 
Mine employee who injured his back in 
work-related accident at age 67, after a 
40-year history of heavy labor in the mines, 
who had less than a high school education, 
and who presented uncontroverted evi-
dence of his impairment and his inability to 
perform work required by his job, along 
with an opinion of the division of vocational 
rehabilitation that he could not be rehabili-
tated, presented a prima facie case that he 
fell into the odd-lot category for an award 
of workers' compensation, even though his 
combined impairment totaled only 26%. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
9. Workers' Compensation <s=>1639 
Where Industrial Commission's denial 
of permanent disability benefits to 67-year-
old mine worker injured in a work-related 
accident appeared to rest almost entirely on 
size of employee's percentage of impair-
ment and on fact that employee was eligi-
ble to retire, rather than on evidence of 
employee's wage-earning capacity, such de-
nial of permanent total disability benefits 
was unsupported by findings of fact. U.C. 
A.1953, 35-1-67, 35-1-84. 
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Virginus Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for Indus. Com'n. 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury Fund. 
James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for State 
Ins. Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This case is a writ of review from the 
Industrial Commission of the State of 
Utah. The appellant, Nolan W. Marshall, 
was employed by the defendant, Emery 
Mining Company, as a maintenance me-
chanic in a coal mine. On January 25, 
1980, the appellant was leaving the mine in 
a minetrip, which is a trailer with wooden 
seats pulled by a tractor. The minetrip 
rolled over a large lump of coal and the 
plaintiff was bounced up and then down on 
the seat, injuring his back. The appellant 
sought medical treatment on January 28, 
receiving medication for pain. He attempt-
ed physical therapy, but discontinued the 
treatment because of additional pain. Dur-
ing this time the appellant continued to 
work, but stopped in early March. On 
March 17, 1980, the appellant underwent 
surgery, a two-space lumbar laminectomy, 
after a diagnosis of acute lumbar disc, 
The operation was successful in reducing 
the appellant's pain, but in July the appel-
lant's doctor noted he was still in discom-
fort and recommended the appellant not 
return to mine work. The appellant was 
then 67 years old. 
The appellant received temporary tota} 
disability payments from March 1, 1980, td 
November 14, 1980. On July 9, 1982, the 
appellant was notified that his application 
for rehabilitation training was denied by 
the Division of Rehabilitation Services be-
cause there was no "reasonable expectation 
that vocational rehabilitation services may 
benefit the individual in terms of employa-
bility." In October 1982, a medical panel 
reviewed the appellant's file and deter-
mined that he had sustained a 10% perma-
nent physical impairment as a result of the 
accident on January 25, 1980. The appel-
lant had some previous physical impair-
ment, and his combined impairment totaled 
26%. The defendant State Insurance Fund 
is liable for 10% of that rating; the defend-
ant Second Injury Fund is responsible for 
the remaining 16%. The findings of the 
medical panel were adopted by the adminis-
trative law judge, who denied permanent 
total disability status, but awarded work-
men's compensation benefits for the Janu-
ary 25, 1980 injury. The findings of fact 
stated that "it appears to the Administra-
tive Law Judge that [the appellant's] prime 
reason for being unemployed at the present 
time is age rather than physical impair-
ment." The defendant Industrial Commis-
sion affirmed the order of the administra-
tive law judge. The appellant seeks rever-
sal of the ruling and a determination that 
he is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits. 
In his brief the appellant asserts that the 
Industrial Commission erred in denying 
him permanent total disability benefits be-
cause of his age. He argues that the per-
manent total disability statute, U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-67 (Supp.1983), does not re-
quire his physical impairment to be the 
primary factor in his disability. The de-
fendants cannot point to a statutory re-
quirement in rebuttal, but argue that case 
law establishes a pattern of a minimum 
percentage of loss of bodily function neces-
sary to support a decree of permanent total 
disability. The defendants cite cases af-
firming denials of benefits to employees 
whose percentage of disability was greater 
than the appellant's and conclude that a 
26% impairment is insufficient for a deter-
mination of permanent total disability. 
Furthermore, the defendants allege the evi-
dence shows that the appellant's January 
1980 injury had little affect on his employa-
bility and that his decision to retire was 
voluntary. 
[1,2] At the outset, we note that the 
purpose of the worker's compensation acts 
is "to secure workmen . . . against becom-
ing objects of charity, by making reason-
able compensation for calamities incidental 
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to the employment . . . . " Henrie v. Rocky 
Mountain Packing Corp., 113 Utah 415, 
427, 196 P.2d 487, 493 (194&). This com-
pensation is not in the form of damages for 
injury, as in a tort action, but in the form 
of payments to compensate for the loss of 
employability resulting from the injury. 
See, e.g., Northwest Carriers v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (1981); 2 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 57.11 (1983). Thus, the Utah work-
er's compensation statutes key the amount 
of the weekly payment not merely to the 
medical nature of the injury, but to a per-
centage of the worker's average weekly 
wages, reflecting the economic impact of 
the injury on the particular individual. See 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 35-1-66, -67 (Supp.1983). 
With regard to permanent total disability 
claims, this Court has stated: 
[A] workman may be found totally dis-
abled if by reason of the disability result-
ing from his injury he cannot perform 
work of the general character he was 
performing when injured, or any other 
work which a man of his capabilities may 
be able to do or to learn to do 
United Park City Mines Company v. 
Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 412, 393 P.2d 800, 
801-02 (1964) (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). Disability is the loss of ability to 
earn. See, e.g., Ashley v. Blue Bell Inc., 
Ala.Civ.App., 401 So.2d 112 (1981); Smith 
v. Carolina "Footwear, Inc., 50 N.C.App. 
460, 274 S.E.2d 386 (1981). Confusion oc-
curs when the word "disability" is used to 
describe a medical condition more properly 
referred to as "impairment" or "physical 
impairment." See Northwest Carriers v. 
Industrial Commission, supra, at 140 n. 
3. For example, it would have been more 
accurate if the above quotation had read: 
"[A] workman may be found totally dis-
abled if by reason of the impairment re-
sulting from his injury he cannot perform 
work." However, an undisputed physical 
impairment may not result in a disability. 
See, e g.y Matthews v. Industrial Commis-
s
™n, Colo.App., 627 P.2d 1123 (1980) (when 
a
 loss of taste and smell does not affect 
employability, there can be no award for 
disability); Tafoya v. Leonard Tire Co., 94 
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N.M. 716, 616 P.2d 429 (N.M.App.1980) 
(nondisabling pain is not compensable be-
cause physical impairment is not the same 
thing as disability); Winn Dixie Stores, 
Inc. v. Linthicum, Fla.App., 376 So.2d 909 
(1979) (a lump on the side resulting from a 
work-related injury did not diminish the 
claimant's earning capacity and thus an 
award of disability benefits was improper). 
[3] Disability is evaluated not in the 
abstract, but in terms of the specific indi-
vidual who has suffered a work-related in-
jury. An injury to a hand would not cause 
the same degree of disability in a teacher, 
for example, as it would in an electrician. 
Thus, in assessing the loss of earning ca-
pacity, a constellation of factors must be 
considered, only one of which is the physi-
cal impairment. Other factors are age, 
education, training and mental capacity. 
See Northwest Carriers v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, at 141; Morrison-
Knudsen Const. Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 18 Utah 2d 390, 424 P.2d 138 
(1967). It is the unique configuration of 
these factors that together will determine 
the impact of the impairment on the indi-
vidual's earning capacity. 
[4] A few examples illustrate why this 
is so. Consider a 25-year-old court reporter 
who suffers a 20% hearing loss in a work-
related accident His total physical impair-
ment is slight, but he is now unemployable 
in the profession for which he was trained. 
However, at 25 and in otherwise good 
health, he is an excellent candidate for re-
habilitation and retraining. He returns to 
college and several years later is able to 
begin a new career in a different field. 
The Commission could reasonably find a 
temporary total disability followed by a 
permanent partial disability. On the other 
ha ad, if the court reporter had been 60 
when his hearing impairment occurred, his 
prospects for retraining would not be fa-
vorable. Depending on his health, mental 
capacity and other experience, his 20% loss 
of hearing could be the basis for finding 
him totally disabled, i.e., unemployable as a 
result of his impairment. In contrast, the 
heavy equipment operator who suffers the 
same hearing loss may experience little, if 
any, loss of wage earning capacity. Thus, 
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total disability does not mean total physical 
impairment. In Entwistle v. Wilkins, 
Utah, 626 P.2d 495 (1981), this Court stated 
total disability does not mean "that the 
injured employee must be unable to do any 
work at all." 
The fact that an injured employee may 
be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn 
occasional wages does not necessarily 
preclude a finding of total disability to 
perform the work or follow the occupa-
tion in which he was injured. His tempo-
rary disability may be found to be total 
if he can no longer perform the duties 
of the character required in his occupa-
tion prior to his injury. 
Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added). Some employees, although dis-
abled with regard to their pre-injury occu-
pation, may be rehabilitated and employed 
again. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-67 requires 
that the employee must cooperate with the 
division K vocational rehabilitation and 
that the division must find that the employ-
ee may not be rehabilitated before the In-
dustrial Commission can order permanent 
total disability benefits. 
[5,6] Some employees, however, cannot 
be rehabilitated and even though not in a 
state of abject helplessness "can no longer 
perform the duties . . . required in [their] 
occupation^]." Entwistle, supra, at 498. 
These employees fall into the so-called 
"odd-lot" category. 
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is ac-
cepted in virtually every jurisdiction, to-
tal disability may be found in the case of 
workers who, while not altogether inca-
pacitated for work, are so handicapped 
that they will not be employed regularly 
in any well-known branch of the labor 
market. 
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compen-
sation § 57.51 at 10-164.24 (1983) (footnote 
omitted). Whether or not an employee 
falls into the odd-lot category depends on 
whether there is regular, dependable work 
available for the employee who does not 
rely on the sympathy of friends or his own 
superhuman efforts. Once the employee 
has presented evidence that he can no long-
er perform the duties required in his occu-
pation and that he cannot be rehabilitated, 
the burden shifts to the employer to prove 
the existence of regular, steady work that 
the employee can perform, taking into ac-
count the employee's education, mental ca-
pacity and age. 2 Larson, supra, 10-164.-
51 to 10^164.54 and cases cited. 
A considerable number of the odd-lot 
cases involve claimants whose adaptabili-
ty to the new situation created by their 
physical injury is constricted by lack of 
mental capacity or education. This is a 
sensible result, since it is a matter of 
common observation that a man whose 
sole stock in trade has been the capacity 
to perform physical movements, and 
whose ability to make those movements 
has b^en impaired by injury, is under a 
BEr&fcT^  tosfctoaritage in fctqmnng ^ de-
pendable new means of livelihood. 
Id. at J0-164.54 to 10-164.63 (footnotes 
omitted)^ A majority of the odd-lot cases 
are conqerned with employees whose work 
required physical labor, and many of those 
employees were 50 years old or older with 
moderate or little education. See, e.g., Hal-
stead Industries v. Jones, Ark.App., 603 
S.W.2d 456 (1980) (affirming total perma-
nent disability benefits to a 59-year-old illit-
erate laborer with a 15% physical impair-
ment); Laughlin v. City of Crowley, La. 
App., 411 So.2d 708 (1982) (54-year-old sani-
tation worker with little education who was 
unable to return to heavy labor found total-
ly and permanently disabled^ under "odd-
lot" doctrine when employer was not able 
to show that there was work available); 
Matter \of Compensation of Livesay, 55 
Or.App. 390, 637 P.2d 1370 (1981) (affirm-
ing total disability benefits to 43-year-old 
laborer with a seventh-grade education and 
no specjal skills whose injuries left him 
with restricted movement, limited strength 
and an inability to sit or stand for any 
length 6f time); Smith v. Asarco, Inc., 
Tenn., ^27 S.W.2d 946 (1982) (affirming 
award 6f total disability benefits to 65-
year-old miner with a sixth-grade education 
who wap physically able to do sedentary 
work in a clean environment). As stated 
above, once the employee has demonstrated 
his impairment and presented evidence that 
he is no longer capable of performing his 
former work and that he cannot be rehabili-
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tated, the burden shifts to the employer to 
show that regular work is available. In 
Brotvn v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 82 N.M. 
424, 483 P.2d 305 (1970), the court of ap-
peals stated: "It is much easier for the 
[employer] to prove the employability of 
the [employee] for a particular job than for 
the [employee] to try to prove the universal 
negative of not being employable at any 
work." Id. at 427, 483 P.2d 305, 483 P.2d 
at 308. See also Employers Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. In-
dustrial Commission, 25 Ariz.App. 117, 
541 P.2d 580 (1975); Transport Indemnity 
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 
157 Cal.App.2d 542, 321 P.2d 21 (1958); 
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977); 
Hill v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Co., 12 
Or.App. 1, 503 P.2d 728 (1972). 
[7,8] This Court may set aside the 
Commission's award if the Commission's 
findings of fact do not support the award. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-84. In the instant 
case, the appellant is a miner with less than 
a high school education who has a 40-year 
history of heavy labor in the mines. He 
presented uncontroverted evidence of his 
impairment, his inability to perform the 
work required by his job and the opinion of 
the division of vocational rehabilitation that 
he could not be rehabilitated. He also tes-
tified that prior to his injury he had fully 
intended to continue to work rather than to 
retire. Thus, the appellant presented a pri-
ma facie case that he falls into the pdd-lot 
category. The defendant Commission did 
not require the defendant employer to dem-
onstrate the availability of regular work 
the appellant could perform, nor did any of 
the defendants present evidence indicating 
that the appellant had any reasonable wage 
earning capacity. As we have discussed, 
benefits are awarded on the basis of dis-
ability, not physical impairment. It ap-
pears the Commission's award in this case 
rested almost entirely on the size of the 
appellant's percentage of impairment and 
on the fact that appellant was eligible to 
retire, rather than on evidence of the appel-
lant's wage-earning capacity. 
1. Utah, 631 P.2d 888 (1981) 
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[9] Therefore, we find that the denial of 
permanent total disability benefits is un-
supported by the Commission's findings of 
fact, and we reverse. We remand this mat-
ter to the Commission for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion, which 
may include further evidence on the ques-
tion of disability as defined herein or mere-
ly a recomputation of benefits based on 
total disability at the discretion of the Com-
mission. Costs are awarded to the appel-
lant. 
STEWART and OAKS, JJ , concurring. 
HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
Plaintiff's contentions of error attack the 
sufficiency ol the evidence to support the 
order of the Commission. This Court's 
standard of review in such cases is as was 
recently stated in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi:l 
[T]he reviewing court's inquiry is wheth-
er the Commission's findh'^s are "arbi-
trary and capricious" or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevita-
ble] conclusion from the evidence" or 
without "any substantial evidence to sup-
port them." Only then should the Com-
mission's findings be displaced. [Brack-
eted language in original] 
The record before us contains substantial 
evidence to support the conclusion reached 
by the Commission that plaintiff's 26 per-
cent permanent partial impairment rating 
did not rise to the level of permanent total 
disability simply because it occurred at a 
time when plaintiff was 69 years of age 
and eligible for retirement. 
Following plaintiff's injury and subse-
quent surgery, his condition improved, and 
his doctor considered him ready fcr work. 
Both tl*e medical panel and the attending 
physicians were in agreement that plain-
tiff's condition had stabilized and that he 
was free from pain. The medical panel 
also observed that plaintiff's "upper ex-
tremity motion was normal for age." Fur-
thermore, plaintiff was performing yard 
work and other household tasks. 
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Plaintiffs injury occurred in January of 
1980, and Dr. Lamb followed his condition 
closely over the next few months. On Au-
gust 27, 1980, he observed: "He [plaintiff] 
did heavy work in the mine and probably 
shouldn't return to this for a couple to 
three months yet." During a subsequent 
examination, plaintiff advised Dr. Lamb 
that he was "in the process of retiring." 
The record adequately supports the con-
clusion that plaintiff's decision to retire 
was voluntary and the natural result of his 
age rather than his inability to perform 
further work. His doctor simply suggest-
ed that he retire because of his age, and he 
did so. Plaintiff testified that miners cus-
tomarily retire between the ages of 60 and 
70. He further testified that upon his 
retirement he became the recipient of social 
security retirement benefits (as distin-
guished from disability benefits) and that 
he was also receiving a pension from his 
labor union. 
I would affirm the order of the Commis-
sion. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HALL, C.J. 
Moroni PERRY, dba Perry's Mill and 
Cabinet Shop, Third-Party Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
PIONEER WHOLESALE SUPPLY COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, and Paine 
Lumber Company, Inc., a corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 18657. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 16, 1984. 
Subcontractor, who was sued by gener-
al contractor for breach of contract for 
installing defective doors, brought third-
party action for indemnity against the sup-
plier and manufacturer of the doors. The 
Fifth District Court, Iron County, Robert 
F. Owens, J., granted summary judgment 
for manufacturer and supplier, and subcon-
tractor appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Oaks, J., held that: (1) trial court was 
correct in rejecting the general statute of 
limitations for actions on contracts; (2) 
(subcontractor's amended third-party com-
plaint would not relate back to date general 
contractor's action was brought; and (3) 
(language of the Uniform Commercial Code 
containing limitations period for actions 
based on breach of warranty in contracts 
for the sale of goods indicates an intent 
that there be repose from all actions based 
on breach of warranty that are brought 
more than four years after tender of deliv-
ery of the goods; thus, indemnity action 
brought by subcontractor against supplier 
ana manufacturer six years after purchase 
Of the goods was properly dismissed. 
Affirmed. 
1. Statutes ®=>223.4 
When two statutory provisions appear 
to conflict, the more specific provision will 
govern over the more general provision. 
2. Statutes <s=>223.4 
Where Uniform Commercial Code sets 
forth a limitation period for a specific type 
of action, this limitation controls over an 
older, more general statute of limitations. 
3. Statutes <3=>223.4 
As the more specific statute, section of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, providing 
that actions for breach of warranty on a 
contract for the sale of goods must be 
commenced within four years after delivery 
Of the goods, prevailed over the general 
Six-year limitation period for an action upon 
a contract in writing, and thus, the UCC 
was the applicable statute of limitations for 
purchaser's cause of action for breach of 
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197, 202 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., dis-
senting). 
The change of circumstances question 
here is a close one. Most of the facts 
recited in the majority opinion could not 
support a finding of a change of circum-
stances. They reflect little more than the 
not uncommon physical mobility and eco-
nomic misfortune that befall many in our 
society. In my view, only the fact of the 
mother leaving the child with the father for 
most of the time after the initial custodial 
award is pertinent to the standard set out 
in Becker: "The asserted change must . . . 
have some material relationship to and sub-
stantial effect on parenting ability [of the 
custodial parent] or the functioning of the 
presently existing custodial relationship." 
($4 P.2d at tfftJ; accord Sfiibji' v. SUtbjt, 
712 P.2d at 200. The mother's failure to 
take active fcustody of the child after custo-
dy was awarded to her does have a "mate-
rial relationship to and substantial effect 
on . . . the functioning of the . . . custodial 
relationship" set up by the initial custody 
order. 
The trial court's initial custody order nec-
essarily anticipated that the mother would 
assume physical custody of the child and 
that she would act to solidify the bond that 
should exist between the custodial parent 
and the child and to provide the stability in 
caregiving that is one of the principal pur-
poses of a one-party custodial arrange-
ment. See Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d at 
510 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Fontenot 
v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d at 1133; Shioji v. 
Shioji, 712 P.2d at 202 (Zimmerman, J., 
dissenting}. Instead, the trial court found 
that she left the child with the father al-
most all the time. This probably had the 
effect of creating stability in the child's life 
and of bonding the child with the primary 
caregiver, but not the one contemplated by 
the court's order. I conclude that the 
mother's actions have resulted in a change 
of circumstances not contemplated by the 
court at the time of the initial award and 
that this change meets the requirements 
set forth in Becker. 
On c e the trial court properly found a 
change
 0f circumstances, it was entitled to 
weigh 
1^1 the evidence in determining the 
placem^nt t n a t Wouid De in the best inter-
ests of the childj U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-10 
(Repl.Voi. 3C, 1984); Williams v. Wil-
liams, 655 P.2J1 652, 653 (Utah 1982); 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54. A factor 
that shouid be gpven heavy weight in such 
an analysis j s tl|e child's interest in main-
taining
 a stabl^ placement. Moody v. 
Moody, 715 p.2d at 510 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring), ghioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d at 
202 (Zim m e r m 2 |n ) jtf dissenting). The 
court s order had the effect of leaving the 
child in his existing placement. Absent a 
strong showing |that this was not the best 
arrang$m e n t f0f the child, I am not per-
suaded that the! trial court abused its dis-
cretion. 
DURHAM. J., concurs in the concurring 
opinion
 o f ZIMMERMAN, J. 
I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Geor^e A r c h } e HARDMAN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT
 LAKE CITY FLEET MANAGE-
MENT &nd Second Injury 
Fund, Defendants. 
No. 20133. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 8, 1986. 
Industrial Commission denied perma-
nent to^i disability benefits to employee 
for industrial injury. Employee sought re-
view, ^he Supreme Court, Howe, J., held 
that eiHpiovee who suffered from partial 
physical disability and from continuous 
headaches> dizziness, nausea, and fainting 
and wh0 w a s almost 60 years old with 
limited kducatfcn and work background es-
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tablished prima facie case of tentative per-
manent total disability before Industrial 
Commission. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <3=>803 
"Disability" is worker's impairment of 
earning capacity and does not refer to per-
centage of physical impairment. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation <£=>1378 
Employee who has been referred to 
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation upon 
Industrial Commission's tentative finding 
of permanent total disability has burden to 
establish inability to be rehabilitated 
through cooperation of Division. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-67. 
3. Workers' Compensation <3=>1377 
Employer's burden to prove existence 
of regular, steady work that can be per-
formed by employee arises after Division 
of Vocation Rehabilitation certifies that 
employee cannot be rehabilitated. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-67. 
4. Workers' Compensation <©=>847 
Showing that there is regular, depend-
able work which is available to and can be 
performed by employee is required to de-
feat tentative finding of permanent total 
disability. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
5. Workers' Compensation ^ ^ Q 
Employee who suffered from partial 
physical disability and from continuous 
headaches, dizziness, nausea, and fainting 
and who was almost 60 years old with 
limited education and work background es-
tablished prima facie case of tentative per-
manent total disability before Industrial 
Commission. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
Ann L. Wassermann, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
1. Evidence about the likelihood of plaintiff hav-
ing had a previous heart condition was offered, 
Ray L. Montgomery, Asst. City Atty., 
Salt Lake City, for the City. 
Lena Hunsaker, Salt Lake City, for Risk 
Management. 
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Sec-
ond Injury Fund. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff George Archie Hardman seeks 
review of an order of the Industrial Com-
mission denying him permanent^ total dis-
ability benefits for an industrial injury. 
On October ], 1981^while plaintiff was 
employed by defendant Salt Lake City, he 
suffered a fractured skull when a steel 
beam fell and struck him on the head. He 
spent nine days in the hospital, and an 
operation was performed on his skull to 
relieve the pressure on his brain. Subse-
quently, several evaluations were made of 
his physical and emotional condition. His 
attorney asked the Industrial Commission 
to nake a finding of tentative permanent 
total disability by taking into consideration 
factors additional to Hardman's physical 
impairment, such as his age and lack^ef 
education or skills. After a hearing on 
October 5, 1983, the administrative law 
judge submitted the matter to a medical 
panel consisting of a neurologist and a 
psychiatrist The panel was asked to as-
sess the extent of Hardman's disability and 
determine whether there was a causal con-
nection between the injury he sustained 
and the disability he then claimed. The 
panel found that Hardman had been tempo-
rarily totally disabled from October 1, 1981, 
until July 1, 1982, and that he had a perma-
nent physical impairment totalling twenty-
five percent, broken down as follows: fif-
teen percent for neuropsychiatric syndrome 
of post-concussion type, five percent for 
the earlier amputation of the left second 
finger, and five percent for persistent inter-
mittent and unexplained pain in the left 
shoulder.1 The administrative law judge 
found that the City had paid $18,351.43 in 
temporary total disability compensation to 
Hardman from October 2, 1981, to April 15, 
although this was not a consideration in the 
Commission's findings. 
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1983, in addition to the payment of medical 
bills totalling $7,081.12. The judge deter-
mined that because Hardman's temporary 
total disability ended July 1, 1982, he had 
been overpaid by the City for temporary 
total disability from July 1, 1982, to April 
15, 1983, in the sum of $9,177.44. Apply-
ing that overpayment to Hardman's perma-
nent partial disability entitlement which 
was awarded him, the City owed him a 
balance of $959.44, which it subsequently 
paid. 
Our standard of review of the Industrial 
Commission's findings of fact in workmen's 
compensation cases is well-settled. We are 
limited to determining whether the Com-
missions's findings are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Higgins v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 700 P.2d 704, 706 
(Utah 1985); Kennecott Corp. v. Industri-
al Commission, 675 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 
1983); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 
P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981); Kent v. Indus-
trial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 385, 57 
P.2d 724, 725 (1936). 
Plaintiff contends that he met his burden 
of proof and presented a prima facie case 
of tentative permanent total disability to 
the Commission. The Workers' Compensa-
tion Act establishes a procedure by which a 
finding of permanent total disability may 
be determined. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-67,2 
provides in pertinent part: 
A finding by the commission of perma-
nent total disability shall in all cases be 
tentative and not final until such time as 
the following proceedings have been had: 
If the employee has tentatively been 
found to be permanently and totally dis-
abled, it shall be mandatory that the 
industrial commission of Utah refer the 
employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of 
education for rehabilitation training 
The Act does not set forth, however, 
those often unquantifiable factors that es-
tablish permanent total disability, even on 
a tentative basis. We are therefore com-
2. Although the section has been subsequently 
amended, this language has remained substan-
Y FLEET MANAGEMENT Utah 1325 
23 (Utah 1986) 
pelled to examine the law as it has evolved 
within the framework of our cases. This 
Court has stated, with regard to permanent 
total disability claims, that a worker may 
be found totally disabled if he can no long-
er perform work of the general nature he 
was performing when injured, or "any oth-
er work which a man of his capabilities 
may be able to do," or to learn to do or for 
which he might be trained. United Park 
City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 
412, 3^3 P.2d 800, 801-02 (1964). 
The Record and the transcript are replete 
with statements from qualified medical per-
sonnel to the effect that plaintiff would 
most ljkely be unable to return to similar 
work. The neurosurgeon who treated him 
rated his permanent partial disability at 
twenty^seven percent. In fact, his own 
doctor stated that statistically approximate-
ly one-third of the persons who experience 
significant head injuries continue to have 
disabilities, mainly headaches and dizzi-
ness, which prevent them from returning 
to work. Dr. Moench, a psychiatrist who 
examined the plaintiff, expressed doubts 
that he could ever "return to his previous 
level qf employment/' At the hearing, 
plaintiff testified that he continued to suf-
fer from severe headaches and episodes of 
light-headedness, dizzy spells, and pain in 
his left shoulder. Plaintiff, a man in his 
late fifties, also testified that he had only a 
sixth-grade education and had been a man-
ual laborer most of his life. 
The medical panel's psychiatric examiner 
diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from an 
accident-caused "post-concussion syndrome 
which is characterized by impairment of 
memory, problems of coordination [and] 
emotional disturbances." The panel's rat-
ing of his disability, however, reflected 
only his physical impairment. It did not 
take into consideration the extent to which 
his physical impairment, compounded by 
other factors, could render him totally dis-
abled. 
tially unchanged. 
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[1] The Commission, by adopting the 
findings of the medical panel as its own, 
failed to carry out its task. It appears to 
have confused the percentage of impair-
ment, a determination which the medical 
panel is qualified to make, with the per-
centage of disability, including factors in 
addition to the physical impairment, which 
it is the Commission's duty to determine. 
In workmen's compensation law, the dis-
ability is the worker's impairment of earn-
ing capacity. Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 
138 (Utah 1981). The Commission's find-
ings failed to acknowledge the odd-lot doc-
trine accepted in most jurisdictions and 
which has been repeatedly approved by this 
Court. That doctrine recognizes the sub-
stantial difference between physical impair-
ment and disability. For example, a low 
percentage of physical impairment is not 
per se less than total permanent disability. 
Numerous other courts applying the odd-
lot doctrine have found permanent total 
disability despite a deceptively low percent-
age of physical impairment See, e.g., Hal-
stead Industries v. Jones, 603 S.W.2d 456 
(Ark.1980) (permanent total disability 
awarded with fifteen percent physical im-
pairment); and Employers Mutual Liabili-
ty Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. Indus-
trial Commission, 25 Ariz.App. 117, 541 
P.2d 580 (1975) (physical functional disabili-
ty of fifteen percent). 
The odd-lot doctrine further requires an 
evaluation of disability in terms of the spe-
cific individual who has suffered a work-re-
lated injury. For example, in Northwest 
Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, supra, we endorsed the doctrine 
and articulated specific concerns which 
must be considered in evaluating an indi-
vidual's disability. We there stated: 
Factors extrinsic to an industrial inju-
ry, such as age, mental abilities, prior 
training, and job market, are appropri-
ate factors in determining an injured 
employee's earning power and degree 
of disability [T]nis Court has previ-
3. On remand, plaintiff was awarded permanent 
total disability benefits and appealed seeking 
interest on the award for past due benefits. See 
ously relied on one or more of these 
factors in determining the ^degree of dis-
ability. 
Id. at 141 (citations omitted; emphasis add-
ed). In Northwest Carriers, the Commis-
sion found that both workers were perma-
nently and totally disabled because of 
factors which comprised the odd-lot doc-
trine. Those employees, although not to-
tally incapable of performing some work, 
were not capable of adapting to a new 
employment situation. This inability to 
adapt may be exacerbated by lack of men-
tal capacity and education. In his treatise, 
Professor Larson defines an employee in 
the odd-lot category as one "who is so 
injured that he can perform no services 
other than those which are so limited in 
quality, dependability, or quantity that a 
reasonably stable market for them does not 
exist." 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compen-
sation Law § 57.51, at 10-164.22 (1975) 
(citation omitted). 
In Northwest Carriers, we applied the 
odd-lot doctrine and found that the ad-
vanced age of the employees, their lack of 
formal education, and their limited training 
and skills, in addition to the physical im-
pairment, were all factors contributing to 
their disability. More recently, we applied 
it in Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 
681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984).3 There, Nolan 
Marshall was denied permanent total dis-
ability benefits after a work-related acci-
dent. He was sixty-seven years old, had 
worked forty years at heavy labor in the 
mines, and had less than a high school 
education. Marshall was a likely candidate 
for the odd-lot category. 
With regard to total disability claims, we 
noted in Marshall: 
Disability is evaluated not in the ab-
stract, but in terms of the specific indi-
vidual who has suffered a work-related 
injury. An injury to a hand would not 
cause the same degree of disability in a 
teacher for example as it would in an 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1985). 
R£ 
HARDMAN v. SALT LAKE CI 
Cite as 725 P.2d 
electrician. Thus, in assessing the lack 
of learning capacity, a constellation of 
factors must be considered, only one of 
which is the physical impairment. Other 
factors are age, education, training and 
mental capacity. See Northwest Carri-
ers v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 
141; Morrison-Knudsen Construction 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 18 Utah 
2d 390, 424 P.2d 138 (1967). It is the 
unique configuration of these factors 
that together will determine the impact 
of the impairment on the individual's 
earning capacity. 
Id. at 211. 
We also stated that: 
[0]nce the employee has presented evi-
dence that he can no longer perform the 
duties required in his occupation, and 
that he cannot be rehabilitated, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to prove the 
existence of regular, steady work that 
the employee can perform, taking into 
account the employee's education, mental 
capacity and age. 
Id. at 212 (citation omitted). 
[2,3] By that three-step process, we did 
not mean that the employee must prove on 
his own that he is unable to be rehabilitat-
ed. Such a requirement would place the 
employee in the untenable position of as-
sessing his own potential for rehabilitation. 
In order for an accurate assessment of his 
rehabilitation potential to be made, section 
35-1-67 requires the Commission to draw 
upon the expertise of the Division of Voca-
tional Rehabilitation. Once the employee 
has been referred there upon the Commis-
sion's tentative finding of permanent total 
disability, the burden is then on the em-
ployee through his cooperation with the 
Division to establish that he cannot be re-
habilitated. If that is done, the Division 
then certifies to the Commission that it has 
received the employee's full cooperation in 
its efforts to rehabilitate him, and that in 
its opinion, he cannot be rehabilitated. It is 
at this time that the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove the "existence of regu-
lar, steady work that the employee can 
perform," taking into account the plain-
er FLEEt1 MANAGEMENT Utah 1327 
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tiff's education, mental capacity, and age. 
Marshall, supra, at 212. See also Lyons 
v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 
Idaho 406, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977); Employ-
ers Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, supra; Hill v. U.S. 
Plywood\Champion Co., 12 Or.App. 1, 503 
P.2d 728 (1972); Brown v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 82 N.M. 424, 483 P.2d 305 (1970); 
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Commission, 157 Cal.App.2d 542, 
321 P.2d |21 (1958); 2 A. Larson, The Law 
of Workmen's Compensation § 57.51 
(1976). Despite the City's contentions that 
it offered various jobs to plaintiff, the 
record is devoid of any concrete evidence 
that he Was offered work of the general 
nature hd had been performing. 
[4] Tlje administrative law judge's sub-
stitution of his judgment for the evaluation 
of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation 
was clearly error. Despite the findings of 
the medical panel and despite his own find-
ings that plaintiff suffered from "continu-
ous headaches, dizziness, [feeling] sick, and 
occasionally [passing] out," all symptoms 
that wou|d diminish one's ability to per-
form most anY work, he still recommended 
that plaintiff look for "jobs such as service 
station attendant [or] motel manager." It 
is not enough in such a case to allege that 
work is available; it must be shown that 
there is re|gular, dependable work available 
for the p|aintiff, without the expectation 
that he will rely on the sympathy of friends 
or his ow i^ "superhuman efforts." Mar-
shall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
at 212. This work must be such that he 
can perforpi it or be trained to so do. See, 
e.g., Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemni-
ty Fund, qupra. 
At almoit the age of sixty, with a limited 
education and an even more limited work 
background, plaintiff is not likely to enter a 
new area 6f the work force. Absent proof 
of employment reasonably available to one 
in the odd-lot category, the injured employ-
ee should be classified as totally disabled. 
Employer^ Mutual Liability Insurance 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 541 P.2d at 
583. 
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[5] Therefore, we hold that plaintiff 
presented a prima facie case of tentative 
permanent total disability to the Commis-
sion. We remand the case to the Commis-
sion for additional proceedings consistent 
with this opinion, including (1) referral to 
the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation 
for a determination of whether plaintiff can 
be rehabilitated, and (2) the taking of fur-
ther medical evidence relating to plaintiffs 
heart condition and the extent to which it 
may affect his disability, as well as any 
other medical evidence deemed necessary 
by the Commission to update plaintiff's 
condition. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
J^\ 
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Rolando S. GARZA, Deceased. 
No. 19360. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 11, 1986. 
Guardian brought suit on behalf of 
children for alleged wrongful death of their 
mother. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., en-
tered judgment for children, and adminis-
trator of father's estate appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) mi-
nors' claims against estate of their father 
did not have to be brought within three 
years of father's death, and (2) punitive 
damages claim did not survive death of 
father. 
Modified and affirmed as modified. 
1. Death <3=*39 
Two-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to claim for wrongful death began to 
run at time of death. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-
28(2). 
2. Death <s=>39 
Two year statute of limitations applica-
ble to minors' wrongfuPdeath claims was 
tolled during their minority. U.C.A.1953, 
78-12-28(2), 78-12-36(1). 
3. Death <s=>39 
Minors' claims against estate of their 
father, for alleged wrongful death of their 
mother, did not have to be presented within 
three years after father's death, where ad-
ministrator of his estate published notice to 
creditors and claims were filed within three 
months of first publication. U.C.A.1953, 
75-3-803(l)(a, b). 
4. Executors and Administrators <s=>211 
Punitive damages claims do not sur-
vive death of tort-feasor and cannot be 
sought from tort-feasor's estate. 
Cecelia M. Espenoza, John L. Black, Jr., 
Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Robert J. Poulsen, Murray, for respon-
dent. 
HOWE, Justice. 
This matter arises in the aftermath of a 
murder-suicide. Rolando Garza shot and 
killed Diane, his wife of three years, on 
June 28, 1978. He then took his own life, 
leaving the couple's two minor children or-
phaned. Cleo Garcia, Diane's mother and 
maternal grandmother of the two children, 
was appointed their guardian. 
On June 18, 1981, almost three years 
after Rolando's death, Roman Garza, Ro-
lando's father, was appointed personal rep-
resentative of his estate. He collected the 
assets of the estate, consisting of $12,-
392.90 in life insurance proceeds, and pub-
lished notice to creditors on December 4, 
1981. 
Cleo Garcia presented a claim against the 
estate on March 2, 1982, which was two 
days before the end of the three-month 
period allowed for the presentment of 
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than that encountered in non-employment 
life and are therefore legally sufficient. 
The medical causation test is likewise satis-
fied by the medical panel's finding that 
"the work activities as described over a 
three-day period could produce a lumbar 
sprain aggravating the preexisting problem 
he had had." No more is needed to hold 
that Miera suffered a compensable indus-
trial accident. 
The case is remanded for a medical eval-
uation of Miera's industrial injury in pro-
portion to his previous disability and a com-
mensurate apportionment of benefit pay-
ments between the Second Injury Fund and 
the State Insurance Fund. Costs are 
awarded to Miera. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
( O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Bruce D. NORTON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, United States Steel 
Corporation, [Self-insured Employer], 
and the Second Injury Fund of the 
State of Utah, Defendants. 
No. 21017. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 25, 1986. 
In petition for review, worker chal-
lenged decision of Industrial Commission 
denying his claim for permanent total dis-
ability. The Supreme Court held that find-
ing that worker was not permanently total-
ly disabled was not supported by sufficient 
evidence where Industrial Commission 
failed to consider worker's vocational histo-
ry, educational limitations, learning disabili-
ty, and age, in concert with his multiple 
disabling condition and need for total reed-
ucation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <3>1639 
Finding that worker was not perma-
nently totally disabled was not supported 
by sufficient evidence where Industrial 
Commission failed to consider worker's vo-
cational history, educational limitations, 
learning Usability, and age, in concert with 
his multiple disabling conditions and need 
for total reeducation. 
2. Workers' Compensation <&=>847 
Fact that worker continued work for 
six years after accident, standing alone, did 
not foreclose worker's claim that he was 
permanently totally disabled where worker 
spent tho$e six years in considerable pain. 
3. Workers' Compensation <s=»847 
Relevant factors in determining wheth-
er worker who returned to work after acci-
dent is permanently totally disabled include 
probable dependability with which injured 
worker c^n sell his services in competitive 
labor market, probability of future impair-
ment of future earning capacity as indi-
cated by nature of injury, age of worker, 
and other relevant factors. 
4. Workers' Compensation <®=*1377 
Only where employee returns to work 
after accident under normal conditions will 
presumptibn of no loss of earning capacity 
stay unas?ailed. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David U Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for Indus. Com'n. 
Erie V., Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury. 
Phil N. Walker, San Francisco, Cal., for 
U.S. Steel] 
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PER CURIAM: 
In this petition for review, petitioner 
Bruce D. Norton challenges the decision of 
the Industrial Commission denying his 
claim for permanent total disability. Nor-
ton contends that the Commission errone-
ously based its findings on medical impair-
ment alone without examining his earning 
capacity, ignored his total disability under 
the "odd-lot" doctrine, and ruled contrary 
to the evidence produced by him in support 
of his claim. None of the defendant par-
ties has filed a response. We reverse and 
remand for a hearing consistent with this 
opinion. 
Norton was employed as a coal miner of 
United States Steel in East Carbon, Utah, 
for thirty-nine years of his life. He was 
sixteen years old when he began working 
full-time in 1943 and fifty-six when he 
stopped working in 1983. He earned a 
living throughout those years by dint of his 
brawn, performing arduous physical labor 
that required little, if any, skills. Norton's 
literacy is marginal at best. 
On August 10, 1977, Norton sustained an 
injury to his neck and shoulder when a 
pulley malfunctioned and sent a heavy ca-
ble crashing down on his neck with such 
force that his face was embedded in the 
coal and he had to be pried out from under 
the cable by his companions. Initial diag-
nosis was contusion over base of neck, no 
fracture. Norton returned to work after 
one week wearing a soft collar. Because 
of persistent pain, he was given a myelo-
gram in December which showed a herniat-
ed disc at C5-C6 interspace and right 
shoulder traumatic bursitis. Moderate irri-
tation of the right C6-C7 nerve roots was 
found as well. Traction and heat were 
prescribed as conservative treatment, with 
a possibility of surgery indicated. Norton 
continued to suffer persistent headaches 
and neck pain which have worsened with 
time, apparently symptoms of residual 
spondylosis and spurring. His company 
physician advised him that the day would 
come when he would want to have surgery. 
Norton was reluctant to take that step and 
1. Norton's challenge to the percentages found 
informed his supervisor that inasmuch as 
he had elected not to have surgery he 
should also take himself off compensation 
and return to work. 
Throughout his remaining working 
years, Norton intermittently underwent 
traction and physical therapy, wore a back 
brace, and took pain medication. During 
the last eighteen months of his work his 
legs felt numb whenever he turned slight-
ly, and at one point he experienced a fif-
teen to twenty minute paralysis of his left 
lower extremity. His left-hand grip and 
strength of the left arm continued to de-
crease to a point where he would drop 
objects and frequently lose feelings in his 
fingers at night. Nonetheless, he worked 
until March of 1983 when he took a medical 
retirement. 
Norton's prior injuries included a broken 
back when he was thirteen years old, re-
sulting in lumbar spine degenerative joint 
disease, right ankle traumatic arthritis 
stemming from a broken ankle, bilateral 
inguinal hernia for which he has been in 
surgery three times, hyperacidity with his-
tory of duodenal ulcer and focal skin can-
cers. Impairments developed after the in-
dustrial injury include tendovaginitis of the 
right little finger, pulmonary allergic bron-
chitis, and hypertensive cardiovascular dis-
ease with cardiomyopathy aggravated by 
life-long obesity. 
Norton was pronounced ineligible for re-
habilitation by the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation before the Commission ren-
dered its final decision. 
Basing his findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law partially upon the report of a 
medical panel, and partially upon the report 
of Norton's own physicians, the administra-
tive law judge found a 14% whole man 
impairment attributable to pre-existing con-
ditions, a 10% uncombined permanent phys-
ical impairment as a result of the industrial 
accident, raising the overall impairment to 
23% of the whole man, and a 31% impair-
ment as a result of all causes that devel-
oped subsequent to the industrial accident. 
by the medical panel and adopted by the admin-
6 1 
NORTON v IND 
Cite as 728 P 2d 
The administrative law judge then conclud 
ed that this impairment construed m a light 
most favorable to Norton did not require a 
finding of permanent total disability The 
administrative law judge noted the impair 
ments that followed the industrial accident, 
stressed the fact that Norton continued to 
work for six more years after the accident, 
concluded that the evidence clearly did not 
warrant a determination that Norton was 
permanently and totally disabled as a con 
sequence of his industrial accident and 
therefore denied that claim Nowhere m 
the findings, conclusions and order, or in 
the affirmance of that order by the Board 
of Review is there any mention about Nor-
ton's eligibility for rehabilitation No find-
ings were made on Norton's earning capac-
ity in his field of endeavor or elsewhere It 
is this lack of findings that mandates a 
reversal and remand for further proceed 
mgs 
Under our well-settled standard of re-
view, we are limited to determining wheth-
er the Commission's findings are .- jpported 
by substantial evidence Hardman v Salt 
Lake City Fleet Management, Utah, 725 
P2d 1323 (1986) (citations omitted) But 
where the findings of fact do not support 
the award, this Court may set aside the 
Commission's award U C A , 1953, § 35-
1-84(2) 
[1] As in Hardman, supra, where it 
confused the percentage of impairment, a 
medical finding, with the percentage of dis-
ability, an administrative evaluation of 
earning capacity, the Commission again 
failed in this case to carry out its task It 
adopted with slight modification the find 
mgs of impairment reported by the medi 
cal panel but then failed in its administra-
tive responsibility and function to evaluate 
Norton's permanent disability which 
should have included such factors as Nor-
ton's * 'present and future ability to engage 
in gainful activity as it is affected by such 
istrative law judge must be rejected The rating 
is proper under the formula explained in Sec 
ond Injury Fund v Perry s Mill and Cabinet 
Shop 684 P2d 1269 (Utah 1984) and Jacobsen 
Construction v Hair 667 P 2d 25 (Utah 1983) 
fSTRIAL COM'N Utah 1027 
125 (Utah 1986) 
diverse factors as age, sex, education, eco-
nomic and social environment, m addition 
to the definite medical factor—permanent 
impairment" 2 As this Court has| stated in 
Marshall v Industrial Commission, 681 
P 2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984) 
This ability is evaluated not iyi the ab-
stract, but m terms of the specific indi-
vidual who has suffered a work related 
injury [I]n assessing th^ lack of 
earning capacity, a constellation of 
factors must be considered, only one of 
which is the physical impairment Other 
factors are age, education, training and 
mental capacities [Citations omitted] 
It is the unique configuration of these 
factors that together will determine the 
impact of the impairment on th£ individu-
al's earning capacity 
Accord Hardman at 1326-1327 No men 
tion is made of those other factors here, m 
spite of the fact that the Commission had 
before it the evaluation of the Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation that Spells out 
Norton's vocational history, educational 
limitations, learning disability and age "m 
concert with his multiple disabling condi-
tions and a need for total re-education " 
That evaluation presents prima facie evi-
dence that Norton, while not ^together 
incapacitated for work, is so handicapped 
that he will not be employed regularly in 
any well-known branch of the labor mar-
ket, Marshall at 212, and therefore falls 
into the so-called "odd-lot" category 
Hardman at 1327 
[2-4]* With respect to the administrative 
law judge's finding that Norton's continued 
work for six years was proof that he was 
not permanently totally disabled in 1983, it 
should be pointed out that that fact stand-
ing alone does not foreclose Norton's claim 
The administrative law judge correctly con-
sidered Norton's return to wofk as one 
factor to be weighed m determining his 
disability He erred when he failed to con 
2 See the Commission s own explanation of the 
difference between impairment and disability in 
Northwest Carriers Inc v Industrial Commis 
swn, 639 P2d 138 140 n 3 (Utah J981) 
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sider the condition under which Norton 
continued his employment, as manifested 
by his finding "the very fact that the appli-
cant continued to work in underground 
mining for six years following his accident 
is convincing evidence that his accident did 
not render him permanently and totally 
disabled/' Norton's decision to return to 
work did not automatically disqualify him 
from receiving permanent total disability 
benefits, where the facts indicate that 
throughout the remainder of his employ he 
was not restored to health. The evidence 
is undisputed that Norton spent the last six 
of his working years in considerable pain. 
Provided that a worker's disability was also 
analyzed within the framework of the odd-
lot doctrine, case law dealing with the 
factor of substantial pain has generally 
held that "[a] worker who cannot return to 
any gainful employment without suffering 
substantial pain is entitled to compensation 
benefits for total disability." Cornea ': v. 
Cameron Offshore Services, Inc., 420 
So.2d 1209 (La.App.1982). 
The presence of substantial pain may 
logically cause an injured worker to fall 
into this odd-lot category, inasmuch as it 
directly affects the probable dependabili-
ty with which the injured worker can sell 
his services in a competitive labor mar-
ket, undistorted by such factors as busi-
ness booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary luck, or 
the superhuman efforts of the claimant 
to rise above his crippling handicaps. 
Calogero v. City of New Orleans, 397 
So.Zd 1252, 1254 (La.l98Q), modified 434 
So.2d 177 (La.App.1983) (benefits affirmed 
on substantial pain theory alone), citing 
L.A. Larson, The Law of Workman's Com-
pensation § 10-164.49 (1980)., The proba-
bility of future impairment of future earn-
ing capacity as indicated by the nature of 
the injury, the age of the worker, and other 
relevant factors must likewise be assessed. 
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Taylor, 468 
S.W.2d 318 (Ky.1971). See also Harwell v. 
Argonaut Insurance Co., 296 Or. 505, 678 
P.2d 1202 (1984); Tsuchiyama v. Kahului 
Trucking and Storage, Inc., 2 Hawaii App. 
659, 638 P.2d 1381 (1982); Smith v. Indus-
trial Commission, 113 Ariz. 304, 552 P.2d 
L198 (1976). Only where the employee re-
turns to work under normal conditions will 
the presumption of no loss of earning ca-
pacity stay unassailed. Midland-Ross 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. 
311, 486 P.2d 793 (1971). 
It may be years before the effect is felt. 
But a man with a stiffened arm or dam-
aged back or badly weakened eye will 
presumably have a harder time doing his 
work well and meeting the competition of 
young and healthy men. When a man 
stands before the worker's compensation 
court with proven permanent physical in-
juries, for which the exclusive remedy 
\\2& abolished a\\ possibility of fcotrcmoT* 
law damages, it is not justifiable to tell 
him he has undergone no impairment of 
earning capacity, solely on the strength 
of current paychecks. 
Cleveland v. Cyprus Industrial Minerals, 
196 Mont. 15, 636 P.2d 1386 (1981), citing 
Ferrno v. Superline Products, 175 Mont 
345, 574 P.2d 251 (1978). It need not be 
restated at great length that the Work-
men's Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed and that any doubt with respect 
to the right of compensation will be re-
solved in favor of the injured employee. 
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Com-
mission, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984); 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 
P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
'Upon remand the Commission is required 
to address Norton's disability in light of 
all factors mentioned ante, and the burden 
will be on the employer to prove the exist-
ence of regular, steady work that Norton 
could perform, taking into account his age, 
limited education, and functional illiteracy, 
as well as his disabling pain. Contrary to 
the Commission's disclaimer noted in 
Northwest Carriers at 140, n. 3, perma-
nent impairment alone is never the sole or 
real criterion of permanent disability, and 
a denial of permanent total disability based 
on it alone invites reversal under well-set-
tled stare decisis.,/ 
The matter is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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hearing or at the trial outside the presence of 
the jury, that there is a continuing objection 
to the evidence challenged in the motion to 
suppress. 
Howe, Justice, and Zimmerman, 
Justice, concur in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Durham. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Alma E. PECK, 
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v. 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO., 
Second Injury Fund and Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 
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Roger D. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for Peck 
Robert R. Finch, Salt Lake City, for Ehuco 
Erie Boorman, Salt Lake City, for Second 
Injury Fund 
David L. Wilkinson, Ralph L. Finlayson, Salt 
Lake City, for Industrial Commission 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
This is an action by plaintiff Alma E. Peck 
challenging an Industrial Commission order 
denying him permanent total disability bene-
fits. We reverse and remand. 
While employed by Eimco Processing Equ-
ipment Company as an industrial maintenance 
mechanic, Peck suffered two compensable 
industrial injuries which resulted in permanent 
physical impairment. The first injury, on 
September 12, 1980, required surgery on 
Peck's right knee and caused a two percent 
impairment of the body. The second injury, 
on December 29, 1982, necessitated surgery on 
Peck's lower back and resulted in a ten 
percent loss of body function. Peck was then 
sixty-three years old. 
Although Peck's last injury occurred in 
December, 1982, he continued to work until 
March 7, 1983, when his doctor prescribed 
surgery. On March 17, back surgery was per-
formec*. On June 27, 1983, Peck returned to 
work under light-duty restrictions. Peck 
applied to the Commission for temporary total 
disability benefits from March 7 to June 27 
and for permanent partial disability benefits 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, 
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thereafter, claiming that the surgery on his 
I back failed to restore his ability to return to 
I his normal work. The Commission set a 
hearing for October 17,1983. 
J After the hearing, the administrative law 
I judge appointed a medical panel to evaluate 
Peck's case. The medical panel concluded that 
Peck suffered a twenty-four percent preexi-
I sting physical impairment and that the indus-
trial injuries combined with the preexisting 
impairments to produce a thirty-three percent 
permanent physical impairment. 
On April 27, 1984, Peck turned sixty-five 
years old. The next day, April 28, ten months 
after returning to work following the back 
[surgery, Peck retired. Peck then requested a 
determination regarding permanent total dis-
ability from the Commission. A second 
hearing was set for September 25, 1984. After 
the second hearing, the Commission sent Peck 
I to the Division of Rehabilitation Services to 
determine whether he could be rehabilitated 
I for other employment. The rehabilitation 
officer concluded that due to his age and 
physical impairments, Peck was not a good 
candidate for rehabilitation. 
1
 On February 28, 1985, the administrative 
law judge issued his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Among his findings, the 
(judge stated: 
The Applicant worked effectively 
before the December 1982 injury 
despite his 279b pre-existing imp-
airment .... The December 1982 
incident only added a 10% impair-
ment. The Applicant was able to 
work effectively in his job for about 
a year after his injuries healed. | There is no evidence of new injury, 
nor is there any medical evidence 
that the Applicant was taken off the 
I job April 28, 1984, because of his 
old injuries. The Applicant just 
plain retired. 
iThe judge ruled, however, that Peck was 
Entitled to temporary total disability benefits 
i"or the period from March 7 to June 27 and, 
t[w]ith great reluctance," that Peck was per-
manently and totally disabled under existing 
IJtah case law and entitled to benefits accor-
dingly. 
Defendant Second Injury Fund appealed to 
t|he Commission to reverse the award of per-
manent total disability benefits. Although the 
Commission upheld the award of temporary 
tptal disability benefits, it reversed the award 
o!f permanent total disability benefits. The 
Commission based its reversal on the judge's 
findings that Peck "did not leave work on 
April 27, 1984 because of old or new injuries" 
<Jnd t n a t Peck "just plain retired." The Com-
mission concluded that Peck failed to meet 
"his burden in showing an inability to return 
to work," as required by Utah Code Ann. 
consult Code^Co's Annotation Service 
£ £ 
Code • Co 
PTOVO, Utth 73 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 27 
§35-1-67 (Supp. 1987). 
Peck seeks review of the Commission's 
order denying permanent total disability ben-
efits. The issues raised are (1) whether Peck is 
entitled, due to his industrial injuries, to per-
manent total disability benefits under the odd-
lot doctrine pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-67, and (2) whether there is evidentiary 
support for the findings of fact made by the 
administrative law judge and adopted by the 
Commission that Peck was "able to work 
effectively in his job for about a year after his 
injuries healed" and that he "just plain 
retired." 
I. 
The ultimate issue presented by this case is 
whether Peck is entitled to permanent total 
disability benefits provided by Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-67 under the odd-lot doctrine 
enunciated in Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 
681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
In Marshall, the Court stated, "Under the 
odd-lot doctrine, ... total disability may be 
found in the case of workers who, while not 
altogether incapacitated for work, are so 
handicapped that they will not be employed 
regularly in any well-known branch of the 
labor market." 681 P.2d at 212 (quoting 2 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensa-
tion §57.51, at 10-164.24 (1983)). The C-art 
further stated: 
[A] workman may be found totally 
disabled if by reason of the disabi-
lity resulting from his injury he 
cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when 
injured, or any other work which a 
man of his capabilities may be able 
to do or to learn to do ... 
Id. at 211 (quoting United Park City Mines 
Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 412, 393 
P.2d 800, 801-02 (1964)) (emphasis omitted). 
The Court further stated that the term 
"disability" means the loss of wage-earning 
capacity and that a disability must be assessed 
in terms of the specific individual who has 
suffered a work-related injury, taking into 
account such factors as age, education, trai-
ning, and mental capacity. "It is the unique 
configuration of these factors that together 
will determine the impact of the impairment 
on the individual's earning capacity." Id. at 
211. See also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 
728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. 
Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 
1323, 1326-27 (Utah 1986). Furthermore, 
Professor Larson states: 
"Total disability" in compensa-
tion law is not to be interpreted 
literally as utter and abject helple-
ssness. Evidence that claimant has 
been able to earn occasional wages 
or perform certain kinds of gainful 
work does not necessarily rule out a 
finding of total disability nor 
require that it be reduced to partial 
... The essence of the test is the 
probable dependability with which 
claimant can sell his services in a 
competitive labor market, undisto-
rted by such factors as business 
booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary 
good luck, or the superhuman 
efforts of the claimant to rise above 
his crippling handicaps. 
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compen-
sation §57 .51(a) , at 10-164.65 , 10-
164.84(18) (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
We enunciated in Marshall the procedure 
for an employee to prove that he is entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits under the 
odd-lot doctrine. The employee must first 
present a prima facie case that no regular, 
dependable work is available to him. To do 
this, the employee must present "evidence that 
he can no longer perform the duties required 
in his occupation and that he cannot be reh-
abilitated" to perform some other type of 
employment. Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212» Once 
the employee has presented a prima facie case, 
"the burden shifts to the employer to prove 
the existence of regular, steady work that the 
employee can perform, taking into account the 
employee's education [work experience], 
mental capacity and age." Id. Failure by the 
employer to meet its burden of proof entitles 
the employee to permanent total disability 
benefits. 
Peck argues that he presented a prima facie 
case of permanent total disability under the 
odd-lot doctrine by proving that he was sixty-
three years old at the time of his last industrial 
accident, had no formal education beyond 
high school, worked his entire life in heavy 
manual labor, was no longer capable of perf-
orming the duties of his job, and could not be 
rehabilitated. The administrative law judge, 
however, found that Peck "was able to work 
effectively in his job for about a year after his 
injuries healed" and that Peck "just plain 
retired" the day after he turned sixty-five 
years old. 
In reviewing the evidentiary basis for find-
ings of fact made by the Industrial Commis-
sion, this Court inquires only whether the 
Commission's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence. Bigfoot's Inc. v. Indus-
trial Commfn, 714 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 
1986). On a thorough review of the record, we 
conclude that the findings of fact made by the 
administrative law judge and adopted by the 
Commission are unsupported by the evidence 
and must be set aside. 
The record contains evidence introduced 
primarily in two hearings, including letters 
Fnr mmnlete Utah Code Annotations, consult CodeeCo's Annotation Service 
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knee are a continuing problem" and that he 
"is not a good candidate for Rehabilitation." 
Nowhere in the record did Eimco ever 
contradict either Peck's testimony or that of 
his fellow employees that he was unable to 
perform his job. Nor did Eimco present any 
evidence or testimony that Peck could, and 
did, adequately perform his job or the duties 
of any other job generally available. Eimco 
attempts to support the Commission's finding 
that Peck worked effectively in his job follo-
wing his injuries by citing that portion of the 
record wherein Peck was asked if he had ever 
"had to turn down any jobs that had been 
assigned to" him and Peck answered that he 
had not. 
However, a proper reading of the context of 
Peck's answer quickly dispels any notion that 
it supports the Commission's finding. Peck 
was asked, "[A]re you able to perform the 
jobs assigned to you?" He responded, "[J]ust 
with help." Eimco's attorney then rephrased 
the question and asked, "[H]ave you had to 
turn down any jobs?" Peck replied that he had 
not accepted any. At that point, the judge 
intervened: 
THE COURT: You haven't been 
assigned any jobs or you haven't -
THE WITNESS: Any jobs that 
weren't very minor jobs. The jobs I 
have worked on, others have been 
with me and taken the brunt of it 
and I have been more a helper than 
anything else and that's about all I 
have been, is a helper. 
THE COURT: The question was, 
have you had to turn down any 
jobs that have been assigned to you. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
In this context, Peck's response that he had 
not turned down any jobs that had been assi-
gned to him does not support a conclusion 
that he was capable of performing the tasks 
required in his job. On the contrary, Peck not 
only explained that he was unable to perform 
his normal duties, but also that Eimco had not 
assigned him the types of jobs he had perfo-
rmed prior to his injury. 
Next, Eimco argues that Peck's return to 
work following his last injury supports the 
judge's findings. Evidently, the fact that Peck 
returned to work and continued to work until 
he retired at age sixty-five was a principal 
factor in the Commission's denial of perma-
nent total disability benefits. The Commission 
stated: 
In the Marshall case, the Applicant 
was unable to return to work after 
his industrial accident. Here, [Peck] 
was obviously able to return to 
work because in fact he did. [Peck] 
worked for nearly one full year 
after his final industrial accident, 
and retired on the day after he 
turned sixty-five years old. The 
facts in this case do not show that 
[Peck] has met his burden of proof 
in showing inability to return to 
work as is required by [Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-67]. 
Although the fact that an employee returns 
to work following an industrial injury may be 
relevant in determining the employee's ability 
to perform the duties of his occupation and 
thus may be a factor in assessing whether the 
employee has suffered any loss of earning 
capacity, that fact alone is not conclusive of 
his ability to work, nor is it dispositive of the 
issue of his earning capacity. We have recently 
held that w[o]nly where the employee returns 
to work under normal conditions will the 
presumption of no loss of earning capacity 
stm unassailed." Norton v. Industrial 
Cohim'n, 728 P.2d at 1028. 
In Norton, we held that the fact that the 
claimant returned to work and continued to 
work for six years following his industrial 
accident "did not automatically disqualify him 
from receiving permanent total disability 
benefits, where the facts indicate[d] that thr-
oughout the remainder of his employment he 
was not restored to health." Id. Other jurisd-
ictions have also awarded permanent total 
disability conefits even though the claimant 
returned to work following the industrial 
injiiry. See Roberts v. WPBT, 395 So. 2d 233, 
234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Liberty Mut. 
Insl Co. v. Archer, 108 Ga. App. 563, 564, 
134 S.E.2d 204, 205 (1963); Schober v. Mou-
ntain Bell Tel, 96 N.M. 376, , 630 P.2d 
1231, 1236 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Harmon v. 
SAIF, 71 Or. App. 724, , 693 P.2d 1366, 
1368 (1985); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. 
Armstrong, 572 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Civ. 
Apd. 1978). See also Allen v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 71 Or. App. 40, , 691 P.2d 137, 
140 (1984). But see Special Indem. Fund v. 
Stockton, 653 P.2d 194, 196 (Okla. 1982). At 
most, the fact that an employee returns to 
work after an industrial injury creates a 
"rebuttable presumption that the claimant has 
not Sustained permanent and total disability." 
Special Indem. Fund v. Stockton, 653 P.2d at 
198. 
Inl this case, Peck presented uncontroverted 
evidence not only of his physical impairment, 
but also of his inability to perform his job, 
including evidence that he was in continual 
pain I and that his fellow employees did much 
of his work for him. Eimco did not controvert 
Peckj's evidence, and as the record stands, 
Peck| clearly rebutted any presumption that he 
able to work effectively following his was 
injuries. 
Eimco next contends that the judge's 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code I 
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from physicians, a medical panel's report, and 
an evaluation of Peck by the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services. The record is replete 
with evidence that Peck was unable to perform 
the normal duties of his occupation, that he 
required the aid of his fellow employees who 
performed the bulk of his work for him, and 
that he suffered continual pain as a result of 
his industrial injuries. 
For example, in the first hearing, on 
October 17, 1983, four months after returning 
to work following his back surgery, Peck tes-
tified that he could no longer perform the 
duties of his job. He testified that his doctor 
told him to "be careful, move slow and not 
lift any more than I have to" and that he 
"hoped my co-workers would take the brunt 
of the load and help me so that I could carry 
on." He also testified that he was unable to 
lift anything or bend over because of pain in 
his legs and back and that after working a few 
days, his leg would go numb* Peck's own 
testimony was supported in the record by two 
letters written to Eimco by Peck's doctor. In 
the first letter, dated one week before Peck 
returned to work June 27, 1983, the doctor 
advised Eimco that Peck would require light-
duty work and good care in the exercise of his 
duties. The doctor also stated, "Cooperation 
from his supervisors and co-workers w^ald 
be helpful to [Peck]." In the second letter, 
dated one month after Peck returned to work, 
the doctor notified Eimco that Peck was 
"concerned about his ability to perform [the] 
heavy work assigned to him" because of his 
impairments. The doctor stated that Peck was 
"trying to do his work and I believe is consc-
ientiously pursuing this goal," but "[w]hether 
or not he will continue to be able to carry out 
the duties assigned to him we will simply have 
to wait and see." 
In addition to Peck's testimony, three of his 
fellow employees were present at the hearing 
and, upon agreement of the parties, proffered 
their testimony through Peck's attorney. 
According to the proffered testimony, one of 
the witnesses "would testify as to [Peck's] 
limitations from and after [his back injury 
and] how people have had to help him, [and] 
the fact that he has really been getting along 
with their help." 
At the second hearing, on September 25, 
1984, five months after Peck retired from 
Eimco, Peck again testified that he could not 
adequately perform his work. When asked 
what kind of job activities he did upon retur-
ning to work, Peck answered: 
Well, I was still in maintenance, 
but I wasn't able to do my work. I 
couldn't have stayed there, but the 
guys I worked with were kind 
enough to take the buffer and make 
it possible for me to hang on. 
ITnr r n m n l o t a TT#aK ftxAa A r,nnts.*l^~r* 
They did all the lifting. If I had 
required any extra lifting or anyt-
hing, they helped me with it because 
I couldn't do it. 
When asked to specify the work constituting 
his normal duties that he could no longer 
perform, Peck stated: 
Well, in lifting, a lot of that mac-
hinery you have to work it into 
place. You take a big gearbox out, 
you have to let it down, and you 
have to manhandle it, or you take 
out gears and they're hard to lift 
.... I couldn't do the work that I 
had done all the years I'd been 
there. 
When asked his reasons for retiring, Peck 
responded that one day he and a fellow emp-
loyee were moving a big gearbox, trying to get 
it into place, when "[m]y back gave out on 
me, my legs went, I fell down, I hit my head 
... and if someone had been depending on me 
supporting my share of it ... somebody could 
have been hurt very bad." He also testified 
that another reason he retired was that his 
department had just undergone a reorganiza-
tion which split-up the crew he had been 
working with and would require that each 
employee do more jobs by himself and that he 
just could not do the work. 
At the second hearing, Dr. Holbrook, who 
headed the medical panel, testified. When 
Peck's attorney asked Dr. Holbrook his 
opinion of whether Peck was physically 
capable of doing his work at Eimco, he 
replied: 
I think it's a reasonable assumption 
that he might or might not ... you 
just about have to follow him 
around all day for a lot of days. 
But, if Mr. Peck says he can't do 
it, I believe that would be a reaso-
nable assumption to make, based 
upon all the various impairments 
that he has. 
Additional evidence supports Peck's claims 
that he was unable to adequately pe-form his 
job following his injuries. The medical panel's 
report, issued prior to the second hearing, 
states that Peck's knees are "aggravated by his 
work activities because of the weakness of his 
back throwing more stress on his knees when 
he lifts" and that his right knee "does occasi-
onally pop," but that mostly there "is a deep 
ache that becomes very sore with a lot of 
activities." Referring to Peck's back, the 
repoit states, "He does still get some numb-
ness and tingling in the right lower extremity 
particularly with lifting ...." The report also 
states that Peck "has returned to work but is 
working more as a helper." In further support 
of Peck's claims, the Rehabilitation Services 
evaluation of Peck states that his "back and 
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finding that Peck "just plain retired" the day 
after he turned sixty-five years old supports 
the Commission's denial of permanent total 
disability benefits.1 In Marshall, however, v*je 
held that the determination whether to award 
permanent total disability benefits must focus 
on the decline in claimant's wage-earning 
capacity and not on the claimant's eligibility 
to retire. 681 P.2d at 213. The mere fact thak 
an employee has retired will not adversely 
affect a determination of permanent total 
disability when the employee has demonstrated 
that his disability from the industrial injury 
significantly influenced his decision to retirej 
See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 145 Ariz. 117, 119, 700 P.2d 504, 
506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Archer, 108 Ga. App. 563, 564, 134 
S.E.2d 204, 205 (1963); Molyneux v. New 
York Tel. Co., 101 A.D.2d 903, , 4751 
N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); 
Bahor v. New York Tel. Co., 91 A.D.2d 756, 
, 458 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982); Robinson v. New York Tel. Co., 86 
A.D.2d 916, , 448 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation 
Appeal Bd., 452 A.2d 611, 613 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1982). See also Tsuchiyama v. Kahului 
Trucking and Storage, 638 P.2d 1381, 1382 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1982). 
Only when a finding is made and supported 
by evidence that the employee's retirement is 
not substantially motivated by his industrial 
injury, but is due primarily to personal or 
other reasons, will a denial of disability ben-
efits be upheld on the basis of voluntary reti-
rement. See Saenger v. Liberty Carton Co., 
281 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1979); Cameron 
v. Carrier Air Conditioning Co., 85 A.D.2d 
864, , 446 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1981); Osowski v. Board of Coop. Educ. 
Serv., 78 A.D.2d 740, , 432 N.Y.S.2d 
729, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). 
Since none of the defendants has produced 
evidence that Peck was able to perform his job 
adequately or that his retirement was not 
substantially related to his industrial injury, 
we must conclude that the Commission's 
findings are wholly unsupported by the evid-
ence. 
We find that Peck presented a prima facie 
case entitling him to permanent total disability 
benefits under the odd-lot doctrine, as set 
forth in Marshall. The following language 
from Marshall controls this case: 
He presented uncontroverted evid-
ence of his impairment, his inability 
to perform the work required by his 
job and the opinion of the division 
of vocational rehabilitation that he 
could not be rehabilitated. He also 
testified that prior to his injury he 
had fully intended to work rather 
than to retire. 
681P.2dat213. 
On this showing, the burden shifted to 
Eimco to demonstrate the availability of 
regular work which Peck could perform to 
indicate whether he had any reasonable wage-
earning capacity. Eimco relied only on the 
facts that Peck returned to work following his 
injury and then retired ten months later. Thus, 
Eimco failed to show any reasonable wage-
earning capacity which rebutted Peck's prima 
facie entitlement to permanent total disability 
benefits. 
n. 
This Court may set aside the Commission's 
award if unsupported by the findings of fact. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-84(2) (1974). In 
this case, the administrative law judge adopted 
the findings of the medical panel that Peck's 
total physical impairment was thirty-three 
percent. However, neither the judge nor the 
Commission in its review of the judge's deci-
sion made any separate assessment of Peck's 
disability by calculating the effect that factors 
such as age, education, and training, in addi-
tion to his permanent physical impairments, 
had on his wage-earning capacity and his 
ability to compete in a competitive job 
market. We have previously held that the 
Commission's adoption of a medical panel's 
findings of physical impairment, without 
further evaluation of the effect which that 
impai rient, when combined with other 
factors, might have on a claimant's wage-
earning capacity, constitutes a failure by the 
Commission to carry out its administrative 
responsibilities under the well-recognized odd-
lot doctrine. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027; 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Manage-
ment, 725 P.2d at 1326. In short, the Com-
mission's findings on disability are therefore 
inadequate to support a denial of permanent 
total disability benefits. 
III. 
In sum, we hold that the Commission's 
[finding that Peck "was able to work effecti-
vely in his job for about a year after his inj-
uries" and that he "just plain retired," are 
imsupported by the evidence and must there-
fore be set aside. We also hold that the denial 
cj)f permanent total disability benefits is unsu-
pported by the Commission's findings of fact. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case 
tp the Commission for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion, including a reas-
sessment of disability and a recomputation of 
benefits based on permanent total disability. 
\^E CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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1. The fact that Peck retired is, of course, true. If 
that is all that the Commission meant by its finding, 
it would have little significance. However, we read 
the finding to indicate that the Commission believed 
that Peck retired because he simply desired to do so 
rather than being, in effect, compelled to do so. 
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HALL, Chief Justice: 
American Salt seeks review of a Public 
Service Commission (PSC) order dismissing its 
verified complaint. 
American Salt harvests salt from the Great 
Salt Lake. By early 1984, the surface of the 
lake had risen to such a level as to endanger 
American Salt's ability to recover sufficient 
amounts of salt to satisfy its markets. In order 
to supplement its inventory, American Salt 
purchased additional salt from Amax. 
In April 1984, American Salt contacted ~>V. 
S. Hatch Co. (Hatch), a Utah common 
carrier,1 about transporting the purchased salt 
from Amax to American Salt's processing 
plant. After physically inspecting the hauling 
route, Hatch entered into an agreement with 
American Salt pursuant to which Hatch would 
be paid less than its applicable general tariff 
(its general commodity tariff) for each of the 
eleven-mile hauls. 
Approximately four miles of the eleven-
mile route were over a public road. Accordi-
ngly, the hauls were subject to the jurisdiction 
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of the PSC.2 However, Hatch neither reque-
sted nor received PSC approval prior to the 
hauling to charge a point-to-point rate (a 
special commodity rate). 
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, Hatch 
hauled salt from April 16 until May 2, 1984. 
Subsequently, a dispute arose between the 
parties, and Hatch brought suit in federal 
district court to recover hauling charges based 
upon its general commodity tariff. 
American Salt then filed a verified compl-
aint with the PSC that sought relief from the 
imposition of Hatch's general commodity 
tariff. This request for relief was based in part 
on the fact that Hatch had made several 
special commodity rate salt hauls for Amer-
ican Salt's competitor, Morton Salt. The 
thirty-mile Morton Salt hauls followed a 
route that included the eleven-mile American 
Salt route. Hatch charged Morton Salt less 
than its general commodity tariff. 
Hatch in turn tiled a motion with suppor-
ting affidavits seeking dismissal of the comp-
laint. In September 1985, the administrative 
law judge who heard Hatch's motion filed his 
report and proposed order, which included 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
report and order, which granted Hatch's 
motion, were adopted by the PSC, and a 
subsequent application for rehearing was 
denied. 
American Salt contends that the PSC had 
the authority and duty to grant its requested 
rate relief. It first claims that application of 
Hatch's general commodity tariff in this case 
is unreasonable and unjust because (1) Hatch 
will recover a windfall profit, (2) having Hatch 
haul the salt at the general commodity rate 
makes no "economic sense" since the hauling 
charges will cause the cost of the salt to exceed 
its retail value, and (3) Hatch told the PSC 
that a lower rate was just and reasonable with 
respect to the Morton Salt hauls, and the PSC 
allowed Hatch to charge Morton Salt a special 
commodity rate. American Salt claims that by 
denying its requested relief, the PSC allowed 
Hatch to charge an unjust and unreasonable 
rate in violation of state law. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law 
provide in part: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission finds that there 
is no genuine issue as to the follo-
wing material facts: 
1. The haul performed by Hatch 
for American Salt was made, in 
part, over a public road of the state 
of Utah. 
4. At the time of the haul, Hatch 
had a salt tariff on file that had 
been properly submitted to and 
approved by this Commission.[3] 
The Public Service Commission has 
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